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Articles

The Great ETF Tax Swindle: The Taxation of
In-kind Redemptions
Jeffrey M. Colon*
ABSTRACT
Since the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine over 30 years ago,
corporations must recognize gain when distributing appreciated property
to their shareholders. Regulated investment companies (RICs), which
generally must be organized as domestic corporations, are exempt from
this rule when distributing property in kind to a redeeming shareholder.
In-kind redemptions, while rare for mutual funds, are a fundamental
feature of exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Because fund managers decide
which securities to distribute, they distribute assets with unrealized gains
and thereby significantly reduce the future tax burdens of their current and
future shareholders. Many ETFs have morphed into investment vehicles
that offer better after-tax returns than IRAs funded with after-tax
contributions.
Furthermore, this rule is now being turbocharged. Some mutual fund
families have created ETF classes of shares for some of their mutual funds,
which permits the ETF shareholders to remove the gains attributable to the
shareholders of the regular share class. Another firm acts as a strategic
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would thank Barnet Phillips IV
and Tyler Robbins for their comments on prior drafts and Jason Balsamo and Jeremy
Exelbert for their excellent research assistance.

1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070717

2

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1

investor to assist mutual funds in eliminating their unrealized gains
through contributions and redemptions. These transactions permit current
and future fund shareholders to inappropriately defer tax on their
economic gains and give ETFs and other mutual funds with ETF share
classes a significant tax advantage over other investment vehicles.
This article considers various options that tax policymakers should
consider to eliminate the ETF tax subsidy including explicitly extending
this favorable tax treatment to all RICs by exempting fund-level gains
from tax, repealing the exemption rule, limiting the amount of unrealized
gains a fund can distribute, requiring ETFs to reduce the basis of their
remaining property by the unrecognized gain of distributed property, or
requiring ETFs to be taxed as partnerships.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015 alone, the top 25 equity exchange-traded funds (ETFs)
distributed tax-free securities with unrealized gains of almost $60 billion
but did not distribute a single cent of taxable net capital gains.1 Since the
redeeming shareholders took a fair market value basis in the distributed
securities, the gain in these securities disappeared.2
ETFs are generally taxed as corporations, but they and other
regulated investment companies (RICs) enjoy a statutory exemption from
the general rule that a corporation must recognize gain when it distributes
appreciated property as a dividend or in redemption of its shares.3
Although in-kind redemptions are rare for closed-end funds and mutual
funds, they are a fundamental characteristic of ETFs.4
It is well known that ETFs strategically distribute low-basis securities
to redeeming shareholders to substantially reduce or eliminate future fundlevel capital gains.5 This gambit permits ETFs to avoid any fund-level
gains and fund shareholders to indefinitely defer their gains until a sale of
their shares. Furthermore, through this mechanism, ETFs can convert
short-term gains at the fund level into long-term gains at the shareholder
level. Consequently, many equity ETFs held directly give taxable
shareholders higher after-tax returns than if they were held in a
nondeductible IRA. This gives ETFs a significant tax advantage over
closed-end funds, mutual funds, foreign investment companies, and other
collective investment vehicles and is certainly a major factor in their
meteoric rise over the last decade.6

1. See $QQH[$7KHIXQGGDWDLQ$QQH[$LVGUDZQIURPWKHIXQGV¶DQQXDOUHSRUWV
covering taxable years beginning in 2015. All sources on file with author.
2. See 26 U.S.C. § 1012 (2012).
3. Id. § 852(b)(6). All other corporations must recognize gain upon the distribution
of appreciated property to their shareholders as a dividend or in redemption of their shares.
See id. § 311(b).
4. See infra Part II.A. At the end of 2015, mutual funds held approximately $15.7
trillion of the total $18.1 trillion held by U.S. investment companies. INV. CO. INST., 2016
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 9 fig.1.1 (56th ed. 2016), www.ici.org/pdf/2016_
factbook.pdf [hereinafter FACT BOOK].
5. David J. Abner & Gary L. Gastineau, ETFs v. Mutual Funds: Tax Efficiency,
https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products/etf/etfs-taxFIDELITY,
efficiency ODVW YLVLWHG )HE    ³)RU WKH PRVW SDUW (7) PDQDJHUV DUH DEOH WR
manage the secondary market transactions in a manner that minimizes the chances of an
in-IXQGFDSLWDOJDLQVHYHQW´ 
6. See Chris Dieterich, The ABCs of ETF Tax-Efficiency; Don’t Forget ETFs Aren’t
(Dec.
28,
2015,
11:10
AM),
Exempt,
BARRON¶S
http://blogs.barrons.com/focusonfunds/2015/12/28/the-abcs-of-etf-tax-efficiency-dontforget-etfs-arent-H[HPSW ³7D[HIILFLHQF\KDVEHHQDPDMRUGULYHUEHKLQGWKHVXFFHVVRIWKH
nearly $2.2 triOOLRQ(7)PDUNHW´ infra Part II.A (discussing ETFs).
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For the first 60 years of the U.S. corporate income tax, a corporation
did not generally recognize gain or loss on the distribution of property to
its shareholders as a dividend, in redemption of its stock, or pursuant to a
liquidation.7 This treatment followed the holding of the venerable case
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, in which the Supreme
Court held that a corporation did not recognize gain on the distribution of
appreciated property as a dividend.8
The first major statutory reversal of the General Utilities doctrine
occurred in 1969 when Congress enacted former § 311(d)(1) to require a
corporation to recognize gain on the distribution of appreciated property
to a shareholder in a redemption of its shares.9 In the same legislation, but
without any discussion in the legislative history, Congress exempted
mutual funds from the gain recognition requirement.10 Consequently, a
mutual fund could continue to distribute appreciated property tax-free to
its shareholders in redemption of their shares.
In 1984, additional amendments to former § 311(d) further curtailed
the scope of the General Utilities doctrine.11 Finally, in 1986, all of the
statutory exceptions to gain recognition in former § 311(d) were
eliminated. In their place, Congress enacted § 311(b), which requires
corporations to recognize gain on the distribution of appreciated property
to their shareholders, whether the corporation distributes property pro rata
or in redemption of the shares of a particular shareholder.12 Without much
7. 26 U.S.C. § 311(a)(2) (1954) (amended in 1969) (stating that a corporation does
not recognize gain or loss on the distribution of property); id. §§ 336(a), 337(a) (stating
that a corporation does not recognize gain or loss on the distribution of property in
liquidation or the sale of property with a 12-month period of adoption of liquidation).
Notwithstanding the general non-recognition rules, gain was required to be recognized on
the distribution of LIFO inventory and property with liabilities greater than basis, and on
the distribution of installment obligations in liquidations. Id. §§ 311(b)±(c), 336.
8. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935). The General
Utilities doctrine was originally codified in § 311(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
which remains in the Code but does not apply if the adjusted basis of the distributed
property exceeds its FMV. 26 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
9. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 905(a), § 311(d)(1), 83 Stat.
487, 713 (amended 1986). The legislative history clarifies that gain recognition was
required whether the redemption was treated as an ordinary distribution under § 301 or an
exchange under § 302(a). H. R. REP. NO. 91-782, at 333 (1969).
10. Sec. 905(a), § 311(d)(2)(G), 83 Stat. at 714.
11. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 54, § 311, 98 Stat.
494, 568. For a discussion, see BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 7.22 (5th ed. 1987).
12. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 631(c), § 311, 100 Stat. 2085, 2272
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 311 (2012)). Section 311(b) applies to distributions
described in §§ 301±07, which include ordinary distributions (generally treated as
GLYLGHQGV XQGHUDQGGLVWULEXWLRQVLQUHGHPSWLRQRIDFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VVKDUHVWKDWDUH
treated as exchanges under § 302(a). An important exception to this rule is § 355, which
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discussion, the exemption from gain recognition for in-kind distributions
by mutual funds was maintained, but it simply migrated from Subchapter
C to Subchapter M as § 852(b)(6).13
Various arguments have been advanced to justify exempting
investment companies from § 311(b). One traditional justification is tied
to a long-standing, non-tax relief valve for mutual funds: the ability of a
mutual fund, in the case of significant shareholder redemption requests, to
distribute assets instead of cash to a redeeming shareholder so as not to be
IRUFHGWRVHOOWKHPDW³ILUHVDOH´SULFHV14 If a mutual fund recognized gain
upon the in-NLQGGLVWULEXWLRQRILWVDVVHWVWKHIXQG¶VFDSLWDOJDLQVPLJKW
increase, and the fund might have to sell additional assets to generate cash
with which to make its required distributions to avoid entity-level tax.15
The additional sales (again perhaps at fire-sale prices) might injure
remaining mutual fund shareholders and potentially increase systemic
market distress if the redemptions were made due to market distress.
Another argument is that since mutual funds are intended to be passthrough entities, i.e., not subject to entity-level taxation, it is incompatible
with pass-through taxation principles to impose entity-level taxation on
the distribution of appreciated assets.16 For instance, entities taxed as
partnerships and trusts do not generally recognize gain or loss when they
distribute appreciated property to their owners.17 Finally, repealing this
rule could thwart the expansion of ETFs, which have grown in popularity

permits a corporation to distribute stock or securities of a controlled corporation to its
shareholders in a spin-off, split-up, or split-off without the recognition of gain or loss. 26
U.S.C. § 355(c) (2012). Another exception is for property distributed to an 80 percent-ormore corporate shareholder in a corporate liquidation. Id. § 337(a).
13. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 311(d)(2)(E) (1982) (amended 1986), with sec. 631(e)(11),
§ 852(b), 100 Stat. at 2274 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 852(b)(6) (2012)).
14. MichaHO 6 3LZRZDU &RPP¶U 6(& 5HPDUNV DW WKH  0XWXDO )XQGV DQG
Investment Management Conference (Mar. 16, 2015).
15. See SUSAN A. JOHNSTON & JAMES R. BROWN, JR., TAXATION OF REGULATED
INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 3.06[2][c] (2016).
16. When the exemption for mutual funds from former § 311(d) was enacted, there
was no discussion in the legislative history for the justification of the mutual fund
exclusion, although a contemporary commentator suggested that justification for the
legislatiRQ³LVSUREDEO\WREHIRXQGLQWKHJHQHUDOOHJLVODWLYHSXUSRVHWRPLQLPL]HWKHWD[
RQUHJXODWHGLQYHVWPHQWFRPSDQLHVRQWKHWKHRU\WKDWWKH\DUHEXWFRQGXLWV´&OLIIRUG/
Porter, Redemption of Stock with Appreciated Property: Section 311(d), 24 TAX LAW. 63,
79 (1970).
17. See 26 U.S.C. § 643(e)(1) (2012) (trusts and estates); id. § 731 (partnerships).
Partnership taxation has mechanisms that ensure that the unrealized gain in distributed
property is eventually taxed. See infra Part III.E.7.
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because they have ameliorated certain structural weaknesses of closed-end
and mutual funds.18
Upon closer examination, none of these justifications holds water.19
It is clear that Congress did not enact this rule with ETFs (currently the
main beneficiary of this rule) in mind: when the exception for mutual
funds originally appeared in 1969 and was subsequently moved to
Subchapter M in 1986, ETFs did not yet exist²the first ETF appeared
only in 1993. Section 852(b)(6) was intended to apply only to mutual
funds, which rarely distributed property in kind.20
Various market mechanisms have developed to turbocharge this
loophole. At least two investment managers, Vanguard and Eaton Vance,
offer funds with a special ETF share class, which permits the funds to
distribute low-basis securities when the ETF shares are redeemed and
thereby eliminate future taxable gains for the mutual fund shareholders.21
Another firm makes strategic investments in mutual funds with the
intention that it will be redeemed with appreciated assets.22 These
investments and the related redemptions permit a fund to eliminate the
IXQG¶V XQUHDOL]HG JDLQV RQ D WD[-free basis, which permits remaining
shareholders to indefinitely defer their economic gains until they liquidate
their investments in the fund.23 These structured investments are clearly
contrary to the intent of Subchapter M and sound tax policy principles.
Because funds that are held in taxable accounts are largely owned by highnet-worth taxpayers, this rule also bestows an untoward benefit on highnet-worth taxpayers.
The ability to distribute assets in kind without the recognition of gain
disproportionately benefits ETFs over closed-end funds, mutual funds, and
other U.S. and foreign collective investment vehicles. If the benefits of
ETFs²low costs and the ability to trade at prices close to Net Asset Value
(NAV) through the day²are truly valuable innovations, ETFs will
continue to thrive without the inappropriate tax subsidy of § 852(b)(6).
The larger problem is that Subchapter M, which governs the taxation
of RICs such as mutual funds and ETFs, is deficient in tracking and
18. See William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded
Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
69, 76±86 (2008).
19. See infra Part III.
20. The IRS has extended the non-recognition rule of § 852(b)(6) to closed-end funds
in various private letter rulings. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part II.D.
22. See infra Part II.D.
23. These investments may have additional benefits to the funds as well, such as
reducing trading costs for redemptions and subscriptions and assisting in managing a
IXQG¶VFDVKGUDJ7KH\DUHGLVFXVVHGinfra at Part II.D.
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DVVLJQLQJ D IXQG¶V WD[DEOH JDLQV WR WKH VKDUHKROGHUV ZKR KDYH
HFRQRPLFDOO\ EHQHILWHG IURP WKHP $ IXQG¶V VKDUHKROGHUV FDQ EH
temporarily overtaxed or undertaxed, and § 852(b)(6) can significantly
exacerbate this problem. Section 852(b)(6) is classified as a tax
expenditure, but somewhat surprisingly, the revenue loss is not
quantified.24
This article explores various alternatives that tax policymakers
should consider in revising Subchapter M, including: exempting from tax
all fund-level capital gains of RICs, repealing § 852(b)(6), requiring
redeeming shareholders to take a carryover basis in distributed securities,
tying the basis of the distributed securities to the percentage of shares
redeemed, reducing the basis of remaining securities by the unrecognized
gain in the distributed securities, and finally, revising Subchapter M to
incorporate certain principles of partnership taxation for ETFs and
possibly mutual funds and closed-end funds.25
Part II gives a brief overview of the different types of investment
companies that are subject to Subchapter M and delineates some of the
regulatory and structural differences between them. It examines the tax
and accounting treatment of in-kind redemptions, describes how this
information is disclosed to investors, and demonstrates how the failure to
tax in-kind redemptions permits current shareholders to inappropriately
defer tax on their economic gains. Part III discusses various alternatives to
the current regime and concludes that tax policymakers should either
repeal § 852(b)(6) or require ETFs to be subject to provisions similar to
those of Subchapter K.

24. JOINT COMM¶N ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016±2020 25 (2017). It is listed as a tax
expenditure for which quantification is not available.
25. This article extends other critiques of Subchapter M. See, e.g., Samuel D.
Brunson, Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the Income Gap, 65 ALA. L. REV. 139, 160 (2013)
(recommending that investors be able to exclude up to ten percent of their dividend income
IURPPXWXDOIXQGVIURPWKHLQYHVWRUV¶WD[DEOHLQFRPH -RKQ&&RDWHV,9Reforming the
Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis,
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 614±18 (2009) (discussing a wide array of mutual fund reforms);
Steven Z. Hodaszy, Tax-Efficient Structure or Tax Shelter? Curbing ETFs’ Use of Section
852(b)(6) for Tax Avoidance, 70 TAX LAW. 537, 599±605 (2017) (arguing that ETFs should
be required to reduce the basis of their remaining securities by the unrecognized gain of
distributed securities); Lee A. Sheppard, ETFs as Tax Shelters, 130 TAX NOTES 1235, 1240
(2011) (critiquing § 852(b)(6)); Shawn P. Travis, The Accelerated and Uneconomic
Bearing of Tax Burdens by Mutual Fund Shareholders, 55 TAX LAW. 819, 853±57 (2002)
(detailing scenarios under which Subchapter M can result in acceleration of tax for fund
shareholders and arguing that fund shareholders should not be taxed on reinvested capital
gains, but should only be taxed when shares are sold or non-capital gain dividends
received).
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II. INVESTMENT COMPANIES
This Part describes the various categories of RICs in the United States
and surveys keys aspects of the U.S. tax regime applicable to RICs.
An investment company falls under the rubric of collective
investment vehicle, which generally refers to a regulated entity that pools
capital from a multitude of investors and acquires and manages investment
assets such as stocks, bonds, commodities, and real estate on behalf of the
investors.26 The investment companies that are subject to the provisions of
the Investment Company Act of 1 WKH³$FW´ 27 DUH³IDFH-amount
FHUWLILFDWH FRPSDQLHV´ ³XQLW LQYHVWPHQW WUXVWV´ DQG ³PDQDJHPHQW
FRPSDQLHV´28 The most important category, management companies,
consists of open-end funds (mutual funds and ETFs) and closed-end
funds.29 At the end of 2015, the total $18.11 trillion investment company
net assets were held (in billions) as follows (percent of the total in
parenthesis):30
Mutual
ClosedETFs
UITs
Total
Funds
End Funds
15,652
261
2,100
94
18,107
(86%)
(1.4%)
(11.5%)
(0.5%)
26. 7KHWHUP³FROOHFWLYHLQYHVWPHQWYHKLFOH´LVPRUHRIWHQXVHGLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
context. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS
WITH RESPECT TO THE INCOME OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES 1 (2010),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/45359261.pdf. This definition excludes private vehicles,
such as hedge funds and private equity funds. U.S. treaties typically use the similar term
³SRROHG LQYHVWPHQW YHKLFOH´ 3,9  See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art. 10, para. 10(b), July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13161 (defining
PIV). The terminology has recently become part of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26
U.S.C. § 897(k)(3)(D) (2012) (defining collective investment vehicle).
27. 7KH$FWUHJXODWHV³LQYHVWPHQWFRPSDQLHV´86&D-3(a)(1) (2012)
(defining investment company to mean any issuer that holds itself out as being engaged
primarily in the business of investing or trading in securities). Certain entities that would
otherwise be classified as investment companies, such as hedge funds and private equity
funds, are not subject to the provisions of the 1940 Act because of statutory exemptions for
private companies. See id. § 80a-3(c)(1) (exempting from the definition of investment
company any issuer whose outstanding securities are owned by 100 or fewer persons and
whose securities are not publicly offered); id. § 80a-3(c)(7) (exempting from the definition
of investment company any issuer whose securities are owned by qualified purchasers and
whose securities are not publicly offered); see also Investment Company Registration and
SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/investment/fastRegulation
Package,
answers/divisionsinvestmentinvcoreg121504htm.html (last modified Dec. 21, 2004).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(1)±(3) (2012) (classifying an investment company as either a
³IDFH-amount cerWLILFDWHFRPSDQ\´³XQLWLQYHVWPHQWWUXVW´RU³PDQDJHPHQWFRPSDQ\´ 
This article does not discuss face-amount certificate companies.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1)±(2) (2012).
30. FACT BOOK, supra note 4, at 9 fig.1.1.

2017]

THE GREAT ETF TAX SWINDLE

9

An investment company generally pursues some version of either an
active management strategy, which entails selecting investments based on
the manager¶s view of their potential for future appreciation (or
depreciation), or a passive strategy in which the fund holds securities that
mimic the returns of an index, such as the S&P 500, Wilshire 5000, or
Dow Jones Industrial Average. An active fund manager strives to generate
returns greater than the returns of a particular benchmark, whereas a
passive fund manager attempts to match the returns of the relevant index
as closely as possible. In recent years, given the superior performance of
passive investment funds over actively managed funds,31 investors have
moved significant assets from active funds to passive funds, especially
ETFs, which have traditionally focused on passive investment strategies.32
A. UITs and Management Companies
There are two basic types of investment companies, Unit Investment
Trusts (UITs) and management companies,33 which in turn are divided into
open-end funds (mutual funds and ETFs) and closed-end funds.34
UITs are organized under a trust indenture, do not have a board of
directors, and issue only redeemable securities that represent an undivided
interest in a unit of specified securities.35 A UIT is formed by a sponsor
that contributes assets to a trust pursuant to a trust indenture, which
designates the trustee, sponsor, and evaluator that administer the trust¶s

31. As of June 30, 2016, 92 percent of large-cap funds underperformed the S&P 500
over the preceding five years. For other market segments, the percentages were close to or
often exceeded 90 percent. AYE M. SOE & RYAN POIRIER, SPIVA U.S. SCORECARD, S&P
DOW JONES INDICES 4 (2016).
32. See, e.g., John Authers & Chris Newlands, Exchange Traded Funds: Taking Over
the Markets, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/a54e75d4-b7f9-11e6ba85-GGD QRWLQJ WKDW ILYH RI WKH ZRUOG¶V VHYHQ PRVW KHDYLO\ WUDGHG HTXLW\
securities are ETFs and $130.7 billion flowed out of all US mutual funds while $240 flowed
into U.S. ETFs over the last 12 months); Robin Wigglesworth & Stephen Foley, Active
Asset Managers Knocked by Shift to Passive Strategies, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/2e975946-fdbf-11e5-b5f5-070dca6d0a0d (reporting that 40
percent of the assets of U.S. equity vehicles are invested passively, up from 18.8 percent
ten years ago; and for 2015, active equity funds had $3.40 billion net outflow while equity
ETFs increased by $7.6 billion).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 4(1)±(3) (2012).
34. Id. § 5(a)(1)±(2).
35. Id. § 4(2). UITs represented in 2016 only about 0.5 percent of the total investment
company net assets, and the total value of assets held by UITs is the same value as it was
in 1998. FACT BOOK, supra note 4, at 9 fig.1.1. The total value of UITs declined
significantly in the 2000s, reaching a low of $29 billion in 2008, but rebounded to $101
billion in 2014. Id.
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operations.36 The UIT issues a fixed number of units to the depositor,
which in turn distributes the units through broker-dealers, registered
investment advisers, and certified financial planners.37 A unitholder can
dispose of its units either by selling them on an exchange or requesting
redemption from the UIT.38 In-kind redemptions are generally permitted
if the unitholder tenders a significant number of units.39
If a UIT can vary the investment of the unitholders,40 it qualifies as a
business entity41 and can elect to be treated as a corporation for tax
purposes.42 To be a RIC for tax purposes, a UIT must be a domestic
corporation.43 To ensure that a UIT is treated as a business entity, the trust
is drafted to permit the trustee to vary the trust¶s investments, for example,
by selling or buying securities.44
36. The trust indenture must satisfy requirements set forth in § 26 of the 1940 Act. 15
U.S.C. § 26 (2012); see, e.g., Elkhorn Unit Tr., Series 1, Prospectus (Form S-6/A) exhibit
1.1.1, art. II, secs. 2.01, 2.03 (Jan. 14, 2015).
37. Elkhorn Unit Tr., Series 5, Prospectus (Form S-6/A) 37±38 (Aug. 4, 2015)
(describing distribution of units).
38. See, e.g., id. at 29±30 (describing how to sell units, including redeeming units).
39. See, e.g., id. at 30 (describing in-kind redemptions).
40. See id. If the UIT cannot vary the investment of the unitholders, it will be
classified as a trust for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (as amended in 1996).
The trust structure is used when the UIT could not otherwise satisfy the diversification
requirements in Subchapter M or does not invest primarily in securities and thus does not
constitute an investment company under the 1940 Act. The sponsors take the position that
the trust is a grantor trust and therefore the unitholders hold an undivided interest in the
trust property. A grantor trust is not subject to entity-level taxation, but instead each trust
XQLWKROGHUPXVWUHFRJQL]HLWVSURUDWDVKDUHRIWKHWUXVW¶VLQFRPHDQGJDLQVSee, e.g., JPM
XF Physical Copper Tr., Prospectus (Form S-1) amend. no. 6, 95 (Jan. 17, 2013)
(discussing the taxation of the trust and its beneficiaries).
41. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1).
42. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 1996) (stating that a business entity
can elect tax classification). A UIT that is treated as a business entity may also be classified
as a corporation if it is a publicly traded partnership under § 7704(a). A partnership is
publicly traded if partnership interests are traded on an established securities market. 26
U.S.C. § 7704(b)(1) (2012). Although most investment partnerships would satisfy the
qualifying income test of § 7704(c) and therefore would not be treated as corporations, the
qualified income exception does not apply to a partnership that would be described in §
851(a) if the partnership were a domestic corporation. Id. § 7701(c)(3). A partnership
interest is publicly traded on a secondary market if the interests are quoted by a broker or
dealer or any person stands ready to effect a buy or sell transaction at the quoted price.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.7704-1(c)(2)(i)±(ii) (1995). Under the check-the-box regulations, an
entity filing an election to be treated as a REIT is deemed to have made an election to be
treated as an association. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(v)(B). There is no similar deemed
election for RICs. See Letter from Keith Lawson, Inv. Co. Inst., to Cynthia Morton, IRS
(June 26, 2012), https://www.ici.org/pdf/26272.pdf. This issue is most relevant for nonpublicly traded entities.
43. 26 U.S.C. § 851(a) (2012).
44. See, e.g., Elkhorn Unit Tr., supra note 36, exhibit 1.1.1, art. 3, sec. 3.07(xii). For
example, the Elkhorn Unit Trust provides:
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An open-end fund is a management company that offers for sale or
has outstanding redeemable shares, which are shares that entitle the holder
to receive from the issuer ³his proportionate share of the issuer¶s current
net assets, or the cash equivalent thereof.´45 The oldest and most popular
open-end fund is the mutual fund, which continually offers its shares for
sale at the fund¶s NAV, and continually offers to purchase or redeem its
shares at the fund¶s NAV.46 Because a mutual fund¶s NAV is generally
determined only at the end of the day, a shareholder requesting to buy or
redeem shares during the day will not know the price he will pay or receive
until the end of the day. This time lag makes traditional mutual funds poor
vehicles to implement rapid trades based on breaking news.
Because a mutual fund must pay redemption proceeds within seven
days,47 a fund must generally hold some relatively liquid securities,
including cash, to satisfy redemption requests.48 Holding cash can cause a
If the Trust is a RIC, that such sale is necessary or advisable (A) to maintain the
qualification of the Trust as a regulated investment company or (B) to provide
funds to make any distribution for a taxable year to avoid imposition of any
income or excise taxes on the Trust or on undistributed income in the Trust. . . .
Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(32), 80a-5(a)(1) (2012) (defining redeemable security and
open-end company, respectively).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 270-22c-1(a) (2017) (requiring redemption or purchase price to be at
the current NAV which is next computed after the redemption or purchase request); id. §
270-22c-1(b)(1) (requiring NAV to be computed at least once per day at a time determined
by the board). For a discussion of the nuances of determining NAV, see James E. Anderson
et. al., Purchase and Sales of Mutual Funds Shares, in 1 MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE
TRADED FUNDS REGULATIONS 16-1 (2015).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012) (stating that a fund must make payment to a
redeeming shareholder within seven days). The market practice is that redemptions
proceeds are paid sooner, sometimes the next day. See Investment Company Liquidity Risk
Management Programs, 81 Fed. Reg. 82,142, 82,143 (Nov. 18, 2016).
48. The SEC issued, in 2016, comprehensive rules that address liquidity issue for
funds and impose requirements that most funds implement and adopt a written liquidity
risk management program as well as reporting and disclosure of illiquid assets held by
management companies. Investment Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs, 81
Fed. Reg. at 82,142. Pursuant to these rules, no fund can acquire any illiquid investment if
the fund would have more than 15 percent of its net assets in illiquid investments. 17 C.F.R.
§ 270-22e-4(b)(iv) (2017). If a fund¶s illiquid assets exceed 15 percent of its net assets, it
is subject to certain disclosure and reporting requirements, and the fund is required to
develop a plan to bring illiquid assets below the 15 percent threshold or to determine that
holding such assets continue to be in the best interest of the fund. Id. An ³illiquid
investment´ is ³any investment that the fund reasonably expects cannot be sold or disposed
of in current market conditions in seven calendar days or less without the sale or disposition
significantly changing the market value of the investment.´ Id. § 270-22e-4(a)(viii). Prior
to the issuance of these rules, the 15 percent threshold was merely a guideline. See
Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Exchange Act, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828 (Mar. 20, 1992)
(revising guidelines of Form N-1A to permit mutual fund to invest up to 15 percent of its
assets in illiquid assets). Modern mutual funds may have access to liquidity facilities
organized by the investment manager.
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fund¶s return to lag behind the relevant benchmark if the return on cash is
less than the return on the fund¶s securities. The lag can be quite
pronounced if the fund¶s underlying investments generate returns greater
than the returns on the cash.
Another consequence of issuing immediately redeemable securities
is that redeeming shareholders can impose significant tax and trading costs
on non-redeeming shareholders. When a fund experiences significant net
redemptions (redemptions in excess of purchases), the fund can be forced
to sell assets to generate the cash necessary to pay the redemption
proceeds. These sales can generate taxable gains, which are attributed
under Subchapter M to the remaining shareholders.49 The issuance of
shares, maintenance of shareholdings, incurrence of trading costs, and the
payment of the redemption proceeds generate additional administrative
costs that are also borne by the fund and perforce by the remaining
shareholders.50
Closed-end funds differ from mutual funds in that closed-end funds
do not issue redeemable securities.51 Closed-end funds raise capital in an
initial or secondary public offering of their shares. Once the capital is
committed to a fund, current shareholders desiring to liquidate their
interests in the fund must sell their shares and investors desiring to own
shares of the fund must acquire their shares on an exchange at a price
determined by the market.52 As long as an orderly market is maintained in
the fund shares, shareholders can exit or buy any time an exchange is open,
and consequently, the fund share prices should incorporate any market
moving information. At the inception of the investment companies in the
1920s, closed-end funds had accumulated much more capital than mutual
funds, but by the mid-1930s mutual funds considerably narrowed the

49. See infra Part II.B.
50. GARY L. GASTINEAU, THE EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS MANUAL 6 (2d. ed. 2010).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(2) (2012) (defining closed-end company to be any
management company that is not an open-end company).
52. Some funds offer liquidity through tender offers, and new shares can be offered
through rights offerings. The rules for tender offers by closed-end funds are found in 17
C.F.R. § 270-22c-3 (2017). See May Joan Hoene, A History and Overview of Mutual Fund
Regulation, in 1 MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS REGULATIONS, supra note
46, at 1A-1; see, e.g., New Ir. Fund, Inc., Amended and Restated Application for an Order
of Exemption under § 17(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (40-APP/A) (Dec.
23, 2016) (requesting permission to permit in-kind tender offer).
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difference.53 In recent years, ETFs have totally eclipsed closed-end funds
in assets under management (AUM).54
Because closed-end funds do not issue redeemable securities, they
can be more appropriate vehicles for holding relatively illiquid portfolios,
such as foreign securities, foreign bonds, and certain high-yield bonds.55
Consequently, the SEC has exempted closed-end funds from the rules
regarding the maximum percentage of illiquid assets that can be held by a
management company.56
One reason for the relative lack of popularity of closed-end funds is
that the shares often trade at a discount or, less frequently, a premium to
NAV. These discounts have been observed since the emergence of
investment companies in the United States almost 100 years ago.57 Many
academic studies have attempted to explain the gap between the market
value of the shares and a fund¶s NAV.58 Importantly, there is no easy
mechanism for investors or fund managers to eliminate the pricing
disparity. This could preclude closed-end funds from being used as
hedging vehicles as their trading price could deviate substantially from the
fund¶s NAV depending on the demand for the shares.59
The frequent deviations from NAV of the share price of closed-end
funds and the end-of-trading-day pricing of open-end funds helped to
stimulate the creation of ETFs, the most important development in
investment companies in the last 60 years. From comprising a quite
modest 0.3 percent ($16 billion) of investment company net assets in 1998,
ETFs at the end of 2015 comprised 12 percent ($2.1 trillion) of net assets.60
The first ETF, Standard & Poor¶s Depositary Receipts (SPDRs)
Trust, Series 1 (³SPDRs S&P 500 Trust´), was formed as a UIT in January

53. In 1929, closed-end funds comprised approximately 90 percent of management
investment companies proper and approximately 95 percent of the assets. H.R. DOC. NO.
70, at 27 (1939). Seven years later, these percentages had dropped to approximately 74
percent and 71 percent respectively. Id.
54. FACT BOOK, supra note 4, at 9 fig.1.1.
55. See Wendell M. Faria, Closed-End Investment Companies, in 1 MUTUAL FUNDS
AND EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS REGULATION, supra note 46, at 33-12.
56. Investment Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs, 81 Fed. Reg.
82,142, 82,152 (Nov. 18, 2016) (effective Jan. 17, 2017) (excluding closed-end companies
from the liquidity rules).
57. H.R. DOC. NO. 70, at 320±23.
58. Faria, supra note 55, at 33-9 (listing various suggested explanations for the
discount phenomenon); Charles Lee et al., Anomalies: Closed End Mutual Funds, 4 J.
ECON. PERSP. 153, 154±55 (1990) (noting that the pricing of closed-end funds presents
several questions).
59. RICHARD A. FERRI, THE ETF BOOK 12 (2008).
60. FACT BOOK, supra note 4, at 9 fig.1.1.
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1993.61 All recent ETFs are organized as open-end funds, but require
exemptive relief from various provisions of the 1940 Act.62 ETFs raise
capital by issuing shares in creation units, which typically consist of a large
number of shares, for example, 50,000, in exchange for a designated
portfolio of securities plus a small cash payment.63
ETFs permit redemptions, but the redemptions are generally paid in
kind²that is, with securities of the ETF, and not in cash. Importantly,
generally only certain large institutional shareholders, known as
authorized participants (APs), are permitted to contribute securities in
exchange for shares and request securities in redemption of shares.64 Both
the contributor and redeemer are charged a transaction fee.65
Non-AP shareholders must purchase and sell their shares on an
exchange at the market price, which reflects the supply and demand for
the ETF shares. It is possible that the ETF share price can deviate from
NAV, but the creation and redemption process by APs helps to ensure that
the exchange price of the ETF does not deviate significantly from the
fund¶s NAV.66 For instance, if the exchange price were greater than the
NAV, an AP could purchase the underlying securities and contribute them
to the ETF at NAV in exchange for shares that could be subsequently sold
for a profit. If the exchange price were less than NAV, the AP could
61. For an overview of the historical development of ETFs, see JOANNE M. HILL ET.
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO EXCHANGED-TRADED FUNDS (ETFS) 14±16 (2015),
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2470/rf.v2015.n3.1; GASTINEAU, supra note 50, at 25±
28; Birdthistle, supra note 18, at 76±78.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 69±70. The term ETF is applied in the
marketplace to investment vehicles that are not RICs or subject to Subchapter M, including
structured notes, partnerships, and securitized commodity products. See What Are the Five
https://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/
ETF
Structures?,
VANGUARD
iip/site/advisor/etfcenter/article/ETF_FiveStructures (last visited Feb. 27, 2017); see, e.g.,
Direxion Shares ETF Tr. II, Prospectus (Form S-1) (Dec. 14, 2016) (indicating that a
commodity pool not subject to the 1940 Act is taxed as a partnership). Unless otherwise
stated, this article focuses solely on ETFs that are RICs. In 2008, when the SEC proposed
regulations codifying exemptive relief for ETFs from provisions of the 1940 Act, it stated
that it had not received an application for exemptive relief for an ETF formed as a UIT
since 2002. Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618, 14,623 (Mar. 11, 2008). The
reason is that open-end funds offer more flexibility than UITs, including the ability to lend
securities and reinvest dividends. Id.
63. For a discussion of the creation procedures, see, for example, SPDR S&P 500
ETF Tr., Prospectus (485BPOS) 40±44 (Jan. 19, 2017). The cash component is the
difference between the NAV of a creation unit and the market value of the deposit
securities. Id. at 55. Some ETFs will issue shares in exchange for cash. See HILL ET AL.,
supra note 61, at 24.
64. SPDR S&P 500 ETF Tr., supra note 63, at 40.
65. Id. at 45 (indicating that the transaction fee is currently $3,000).
66. A recent study has found evidence of significant mispricing in certain ETFs. Antti
Petajisto, Inefficiencies in the Pricing of Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 24,
25 (2017).
AL.,
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purchase the shares and then request redemption from the ETF in exchange
for securities that could be sold for a profit.67
ETFs can mitigate many of the structural shortcomings of mutual and
closed-end funds. The redemption and creation process helps to ensure that
the market price of the ETF shares does not vary substantially from NAV,
thus avoiding the discounts and premiums often arising in closed-end
funds. Non-AP shareholders generally have instant liquidity at real-time
NAV, thus eliminating the end-of-day pricing of mutual funds, albeit at
the cost of executing the trades through a broker. The costs associated with
acquiring, selling, and redeeming shares are borne by the shareholders
engaging in such transactions and not by the non-redeeming shareholders.
Moreover, because ETFs generally make in-kind redemptions, an
ETF does not have to sell securities to generate cash, and thus it potentially
avoids generating taxable gains for non-redeeming shareholders.
Moreover, as discussed below, funds can strategically use the redemption
mechanism to eliminate their capital gains and thereby permit nonredeeming shareholders to defer taxes on their economic gains. These
factors, plus the growing investor demand for low-cost, passive investing
strategies, have driven the explosive demand for ETFs.68
ETFs have certain characteristics of mutual funds and closed-end
funds and do not fit squarely within the regulatory regime of either.
Consequently, ETFs need regulatory exemptive relief from various
provisions of the 1940 Act and the Securities Act of 1933 (the ³1933 Act´)
to be publicly offered.69 In particular, ETFs generally require exemptions
from the one-class-of share requirement, the requirement to issue shares at
NAV, and the exemption from prohibited transactions with affiliates.70
67. See HILL ET AL., supra note 61, at 25± ³>7@KH EDFN-and-forth
creation/redemption mechanism is key to keeping the price of an ETF in a tight range
around the NAV of the portfolio of securities it holds.´). This mechanism is not perfect and
there have been instances in which a significant difference has arisen between an ETF¶s
NAV and its share price. See, e.g., Nicole Bullock & Dan McCrum, Rapid Rise of ETFs
Sparks Growing Pains, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/
cf69b382-bade-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080 (noting various notable instances over the last
three years in which market volatility had led to significant divergences of ETF share price
and NAV and concerns that redemption process may exacerbates losses when market in
underlying securities is shallower than market in ETF shares).
68. Authers & Newlands, supra note 32. This growth, however, may be a harbinger
of future problems. See John Bogle, The Lessons We Must Take from ETFs, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/f406d50c-bbcf-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080
(critiquing high trading activity of ETFs and suggesting that such activity may ultimately
harm shareholders).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to exempt transactions,
persons, and securities from the requirements of the 1940 Act).
70. See, e.g., USAA ETF Tr., Exemptive Order Application for Asset Management
Company (40-APP) 26±38 (Aug. 18, 2016) (requesting exemptive relief from:
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed rules in 2008
that would make certain exemptions for ETFs automatic, but they have not
been finalized.71
Although UITs, mutual funds, closed-end funds, and ETFs have
distinct mechanisms for raising capital from investors and providing for
investor exits, all are subject to the same tax regime of Subchapter M,
which is described next.72
B. Overview of Investment Company Taxation
RICs and their shareholders are taxed under Subchapter M,73 which
reflects two fundamental tax policy goals: to exempt RICs from entitylevel tax and to pass through the character of most mutual fund income to
its shareholders. Subchapter M is a pass-through regime in some ways like
the pass-through regimes applicable to S corporations and partnerships,
but it implements pass-through taxation differently than either. Both
partnerships and S corporations are generally exempt from entity-level
taxation,74 but their owners are taxed annually on their share of the entity¶s
income.75 In contrast, RICs are subject to entity-level taxation, but because
RICs can deduct dividends paid, RICs generally avoid entity-level tax by
paying out all their income and gains as deductible dividends.
To qualify as a RIC under Subchapter M, an entity must be a U.S.
corporation that is registered under the 1940 Act as either a management

§ 2(a)(32) (definition of redeemable security); § 5(a)(1) (definition of open-end company);
§ 22(d) and Rule 22c-1 (redemption at NAV requirement); § 17(a)(1) (dealings in the fund
shares by affiliates); § 22(e) (seven-day limit on the right of redemption)).
71. Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618 (proposed Mar. 11, 2008),
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8901fr.pdf.
72. Funds use different state organizational vehicles, for example, corporations,
business trusts, or limited partnerships. In addition, funds can be separate entities with a
single class of shares, separate series of shares, or separate classes of shares. For an
overview of different fund structures, see Sarah E. Cogan & Christopher P. Healey, Fund
Formation, 1 MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS REGULATIONS, supra note
46, at 2-1.
73. 26 U.S.C. §§ 851±55 (2012). Other provisions outside of Subchapter M may also
affect a fund¶s tax liability. See e.g., id. § 4982 (imposing four percent excise tax on certain
retained capital gains).
74. See id. §§ 701, 702(a), 1363(a), 1366(a) (stating, respectively, that partnerships
are not subject to income tax; each partner must take into account his distributive share of
the partnership¶s income; S corporations are generally not subject to tax; and each
shareholder must take into account her pro rata share of the S corporation¶s items of
income, loss, and deduction).
75. Id. § 702(a) (requiring each partner to take into account separately its distributive
share of certain partnership items of income and loss); id. § 1366(a) (requiring a
shareholder of S corporation to take into account its pro rata share of the corporation¶s
items of income and loss).
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company or UIT.76 Moreover, the corporation must derive at least 90
percent of its gross income as passive income, i.e., dividends, interest, and
gains from the sale of stock or securities, and satisfy certain diversification
requirements with respect to its assets.77
To avoid entity-level tax, a RIC may deduct dividends paid to its
shareholders from its investment company taxable income (ICTI).78
Because ICTI is computed without regard to net capital gains,79 a RIC is
also permitted to deduct capital gains dividends against its net capital
gains.80
To prevent a fund from accumulating income, a RIC is only eligible
for the benefits of Subchapter M if it distributes at least 90 percent of the
sum of its ICTI and tax-exempt interest income, computed without regard
to the dividends paid deduction.81 A RIC thus differs from a partnership
and S corporation in that a RIC is nominally subject to tax to the extent
that it does not distribute its net capital gains and ICTI. A RIC, therefore,
might be described as a ³tax centaur´ in that, at times, corporate tax
(separate entity) principles dominate and, at other times, pass-through
principles dominate.82
Besides the avoidance of entity-level taxation, another fundamental
characteristic of a pass-through regime is that the entity¶s income and
losses maintain their same character when passed through to the entity¶s
owners. Both Subchapters S and K specifically provide for such

76. Id. § 851(a)(1)(A). Common trust funds and business development companies can
also be RICs. Id. § 851(a)(1)(B) (treating business development companies as RICs); id. §
851(a)(2) (treating certain common trust funds as RICs). A discussion of such entities is
beyond the scope of this article. The terms fund and RIC are used interchangeably in this
article.
77. Id. § 851(b)(2) (defining gross income test); id. § 851(b)(3) (defining
diversification test); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.851-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1978), 81
Fed. Reg. 66,576 (Sept. 28, 2016) (modifying definition of gross income).
78. 26 U.S.C. § 852(b)(2) (2012) (defining investment company taxable income); id.
§ 852(b)(2)(D) (permitting a deduction against investment company taxable income for
dividends paid to shareholders).
79. See id. § 852(b)(2)(A).
80. Id. § 852(b)(3)(A)±(B) (subjecting RIC to tax on the excess of net capital gains
over the deduction for dividends paid determined with references to capital gain dividends).
81. Id. § 852(a)(1)(A)±(B). A RIC can retain its net capital gains, but the gains will
bear corporate tax. Id. § 852(b)(1). A RIC can elect to require its shareholders to include
in income the retained net capital gains, and shareholders will receive a credit for corporate
taxes paid on the retained capital gains. Id. § 852(b)(3)(D)(i)±(ii). The shareholders are
entitled to adjust the basis of their RIC shares by the amount of the retained gains less the
corporate tax paid. Id. § 852(b)(3)(D)(iii).
82. RICs have been described as pseudo pass-through entities. See generally Donald
E. Rocap & Russell S. Light, The Mixed-Up World of Pseudo Passthroughs, TAXES, Mar.
2007, at 323.
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treatment.83 Although Subchapter M does not contain the same explicit
statutory mandate, a RIC¶s shareholders get look-through treatment for
their share of the RIC¶s net capital gains, tax-exempt interest, and qualified
dividends.84 In addition, certain RICs can pass through foreign tax credits
if they invest in foreign securities and earn mostly foreign source income.85
Subchapter M fails to implement a true pass-through regime for
certain items of income and expenses. For instance, a RIC¶s short-term
capital gains do not retain their character as short-term gains, and because
they are included in ICTI, they are taxed as ordinary dividend income
when distributed to a RIC¶s U.S. shareholders.86 This is generally not
beneficial to taxable individual shareholders because they cannot use the
short-term gains to offset capital losses that are limited by § 1211.87
On the other hand, a RIC can net investment expenses against ICTI,
whereas if the RIC were organized as a partnership or the shareholder
directly incurred such expenses, such investment expenses would
probably be subject to limitations at the owner level.88 This rule is
generally beneficial to taxable shareholders. Finally, losses are not passed
through to fund shareholders; instead, the losses remain at the RIC level
where they can be used to offset future gains.
Since a partnership¶s and S corporation¶s owners are taxed on their
share of the entity¶s income, regardless of whether it is distributed, they

83. See 26 U.S.C. § 702(b) (2012); id. § 1366(a).
84. Because capital losses can offset capital gains, the amount of short-term gains
included in taxable income will equal the excess of short-term gains over short-term losses
and long-term losses over long-term gains, if any. Id. § 1222(5) (defining short-term capital
gain); id. § 1222(8) (defining net long-term capital loss); see also id. id. § 852(b)(3)(B)
(treating capital gain dividend as LTCG); id. § 852(b)(5)(B) (treating exempt-interest
dividend as tax-exempt interest under § 103); id. § 854(a) (defining capital gain dividend
not treated as dividend); id. § 854(b)(1)(B) (qualified dividends).
85. See id. § 853(a)(1).
86. Short-term capital gains retain their character as capital gains when distributed to
foreign shareholders. See id. § 871(k)(2)(D) (exempting foreign persons from tax on shortterm capital gain dividends distributed by mutual fund). For a discussion of this and other
related provisions, see Jeffrey M. Colon, Foreign Investors in U.S. Mutual Funds: The
Trouble with Treaties, 35 VA. TAX REV. 483 (2016).
87. See 26 U.S.C. § 1211 (2012) (permitting capital losses to be used without limit
against capital gains and any excess to be deducted against ordinary income up to $3,000).
88. Id. § 66(a)(1). These investment expenses also do not offset favorably taxed
NCGs or qualified dividend income. See Rev. Rul. 2005-31, 2005-1 C.B. 1084. For
individuals, the expenses would likely be deductible under § 212, but since these
deductions are miscellaneous itemized deductions, an individual can deduct them only to
the extent they exceed two percent of adjusted gross income. 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) (2012). In
addition, the Treasury may not write regulations that prohibit the indirect deduction of
these expenses for publicly offered RICs. Id. § 67(c).
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must adjust the basis of their ownership interest.89 Without the basis
adjustment, upon the sale of the equity interest, the owner¶s gain or loss
would duplicate the gain or loss already recognized.
Because a RIC is nominally taxed on its income and gains but avoids
entity-level taxation by distributing its income or gains, the distributions
are treated as dividends in the hands of shareholders, albeit with the
character adjustments described above. Consequently, a shareholder is
generally not permitted to adjust the basis of his shares for the income or
gain received or not distributed.90 Similarly, because a RIC cannot pass
through losses to its shareholders, any expenses in excess of income and
capital losses carryovers in the hands of the RIC remain at the RIC level.91
Subchapter M is a ³tax centaur´: it is an amalgamation of separateentity and pass-through tax principles. Corporate tax concepts of
Subchapter M include taxing RICs on their retained income and gains,
taxing shareholders on contributions of property to a RIC, 92 treating RICs
as corporations for mergers and acquisitions, and requiring RICs to
maintain earnings and profits accounts for retained earnings (and gains).
Pass-through tax principles applicable to RICs include unlimited
deductions for payouts of income and gains and maintenance of character
of most RIC distributions in the hands of shareholders. The treatment of a
RIC¶s in-kind redemptions, however, is sui generis: unlike all other
corporations, including S corporations, RICs are not subject to tax on the
distributions of appreciated property, but unlike partnerships, RIC
shareholders take a fair-market value (FMV) basis in the distributed
property. Thus, the gain in the distributed property disappears. The
regulation of in-kind redemptions and their tax treatment are discussed
next.

89. See id. § 705(a)(1) (requiring partner to increase basis by distributive share of
partnership income); id. § 1367(a) (requiring S corporation shareholder to increase basis
for income inclusion).
90. 7KHHOHFWLRQWRDWWULEXWHUHWDLQHGJDLQVGLUHFWO\WRDQ5,&¶VVKDUHKROGHUVLVRQH
instance in which Subchapter M incorporates certain pass-through principles by allowing
basis adjustment for retained gains. Id. § 852(b)(3)(D); see supra note 82.
91. Capital losses can be carried over indefinitely. Id. § 1212(a)(3)(A). Net operating
losses cannot be carried over to reduce a RIC¶s investment taxable income in a subsequent
year, but since they reduce NAV, they will reduce a shareholder¶s gain or increase loss
upon a sale of the shares. Id. § 852(b)(2)(B).
92. See, e.g., Syntax ETF Tr., Preliminary Prospectus (N-1A) (Jan. 18, 2017) (stating
that an AP will recognize gain or loss upon the contribution of securities contributed to the
ETF). This same fund states that it can reject contributions of securities if the transferor
would not recognize gain or loss under § 351 because it was in control of the ETF
immediately after the transfer. Id. at 49.
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C. In-kind Redemptions
1. Regulatory and Accounting Rules
An open-end company is ³a management company which is offering
for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the
issuer.´93 The term ³redeemable´ security is defined as ³any security . . .
under the terms of which the holder . . . is entitled . . . to receive
approximately his proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets,
or the cash equivalent thereof.´94 In-kind redemptions of securities were
clearly contemplated from the genesis of the federal regulation of mutual
funds in the 1940 Act, although mutual funds almost always redeemed
shareholders with cash.95
Prior to offering shares for sale, an open-end fund is required under
both the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act to file a registration statement, which
is subject to review and approval by the SEC.96 The information that must
be disclosed in the registration statement is found in Form N-1A and the
accompanying instructions.97 Parts A and B of Form N-1A detail the
information required to be disclosed in the fund¶s prospectus98 and the
statement of additional information (SAI).99 Part C describes the other
information that the fund must supply to the SEC, including, inter alia, the
articles of incorporation, by-laws, and instruments defining rights of
security holders.100
Information on a shareholder¶s right to request redemption of its
shares and the fund¶s right to satisfy the redemption request in cash or in
93. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2012).
94. Id. § 80a-2(a)(32) (emphasis added).
95. See Investment Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs, 81 Fed. Reg.
82,142, 82,145 n.24 (Nov. 18, 2016).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2012) (prohibiting issuer to use the mails or other means
of interstate commerce to sell securities unless registration statement is in effect); id.
§ 80a-7 (prohibiting a fund to engage in business unless registered under the 1940 Act).
For a review of the registration process, see Michael Glazer, Prospectus Disclosure and
Delivery Requirements, in 1 MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS REGULATION,
supra note 46, at 4-1.
97. Closed-end funds must file form N-2. 17 C.F.R. § 239.14 (1978). Because closedend funds do not offer shareholders the right to redeem their shares, they are not discussed
in this Part.
98. $IXQGPXVWGHOLYHUD³VXPPDU\SURVSHFWXV´WRDOOSXUFKDVHUVRILWVVKDUHVDQG
make available online a copy of its more detailed ³statutory prospectus.´ Id. §§ 230±498(c)
(2017).
99. Id. § 239.15A (requiring Form N-1A to be used for the registration of securities
of open-end companies, i.e., mutual funds and ETFs, under the 1933 Act). Once the
registration statement is approved, the fund must file with the SEC copies of the fund¶s
prospectus and SAI. Id. § 230.497(c).
100. SEC, Form N-1A, item 28(a)±(c).
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kind is found in these documents. Form N-1A, Item 11(c)(3) requires a
fund to disclose whether in-kind redemptions are permitted,101 and Item
11(e) must also describe relevant information relating to the frequent
purchase and redemption of fund shares. A fund must also file as an
attachment to its registration form the fund¶s articles of incorporation,
charter, or declaration of trust.102 The relevant formation document will
describe the redemption rights of the fund¶s shareholders and the fund¶s
right to redeem in kind. Also, the description of the capital stock of the
fund must provide a fund discussion of, inter alia, the redemption
provisions of each class of capital stock.103
To give flexibility to the fund manager, the offering document will
generally reserve the right to pay shareholder redemption proceeds in
kind.104 After the SEC approves a fund¶s registration statement, the
disclosures regarding shareholder and fund redemption rights can be found
in both a fund¶s prospectus and SAI.105
Pursuant to Rule 18f-1, if an open-end fund has the right to make inkind redemptions, it may elect to commit to pay in cash all requests for
redemptions limited in amount for each shareholder for any 90-day period
to the lesser of: (1) $250,000; or (2) one percent of the NAV of the fund
at the beginning of the 90-day period.106 Thus, a fund that issues
redeemable shares possesses the right to redeem in kind, unless it
101. Id. at item 11(c)(3) (requiring funds to disclose whether in-kind redemptions are
permitted).
102. Id. at item 28(a). The particular instrument depends on whether the fund is
organized pursuant to state corporate law or business trust law. For an overview of the
various organizational forms, see Cogan & Healey, supra note 72, at 2-1.
103. SEC, Form N-1A, item 22(a)(2)(viii).
104. See, e.g., Centerstone Inv¶rs Tr., Amendment and Declaration of Trust (Form N1A), exhibit 99.a, art. II, sec. 2(b) (Jan. 13, 2016):
Payments for Shares so redeemed by the Trust shall be made in cash, except
payment for such Shares may, at the option of the Board of Trustees, or such
officer or officers as it may duly authorize in its complete discretion, be made in
kind or partially in cash and partially in kind. In case of any payment in kind, the
Board of Trustees, or its delegate, shall have absolute discretion as to what
security or securities of the Trust shall be distributed in kind and the amount of
the same.
Id. at 21.
105. See, e.g., Fidelity Contrafund, Prospectus (Form 485BPOS) 17 (Feb. 26, 2016)
(³Redemption proceeds may be paid in securities or other property rather than in cash if
the Adviser determines it is in the best interests of a fund.´); Fidelity Contrafund, Statement
of Additional Information (Form 485APOS) 9 (Dec. 2, 2016) (³When possible, Fidelity
will consider how to minimize these potential adverse effects [of large redemptions], and
may take such actions as it deems appropriate to address potential adverse effects,
including redemption of shares in-kind rather than in cash.´).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-1(a) (2017). The election, which is irrevocable, has to be
disclosed in either the prospectus or statement of additional information. The election is
filed on Form N-18F-1.
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specifically elects not to reserve this right for certain redemptions. Form
N-1A, Item 23(d) requires a fund to state whether it has received an order
of exemption under § 18(f).107
Once a fund¶s registration statement has been approved by the SEC
and it issues shares to the public, the fund is subject to a panoply of
accounting and financial disclosure rules. Some of these rules are
mandated by statute, e.g., the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act, and implemented
by various SEC rules, e.g., Rule S-X, which prescribes rules for the
presentation and content of financial disclosures.108 In addition, funds
must follow generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) generally
applicable to investment companies when disclosing their financial
results.109
The registration documents discussed above detail a fund¶s right to
redeem a shareholder in cash and in kind. The extent that a fund does so,
however, is found in the fund¶s annual and semiannual financial reports.110
In its annual report, a fund must separately list its investments by the
name of the issuer, the number of shares held, and the value of the
investments and further group the investments by the type of investments,
e.g., common stock, preferred stock, convertible preferred stock, and the
related industry.111 The investments in securities are listed on the balance
sheet at their fair value, which is defined as the ³price that would be
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly
transaction between market participants at the measurement date.´112 The
subtotal value of each type of investment is listed and the cost for financial
reporting purposes is shown parenthetically for each subtotal as well as the
percentage of net assets of a fund that each type of investment
represents.113 The total unrealized gain or loss in the investment assets
equals the sum of the unrealized gains and losses in the securities broken
out by type of investment.
107. SEC, Form N-1A, item 23(d) (requiring funds to state whether they have received
an order of exemption under § 18(f)).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2017).
109. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ASC TOPIC NO. 946-15-2, FINANCIAL
SERVICES²INVESTMENT COMPANIES (2016). The GAAP guidance incorporates SECmandated accounting rules.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(a) (2012) (requiring registered investment company to file
annual report with the SEC); id. § 80a-29(e) (requiring registered investment company to
send semiannual reports to shareholders); 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-1 (2017) (requiring
registered investment companies to file a semiannual report on Form N-SAR).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 210.12-12(1)±(2) (2017). The regulations set forth other information
that must be supplied. Id.
112. ASC TOPIC NO. 946, supra note 109, at 6.
113. 17 C.F.R. § 210.12-12(2) (2017). For each restricted security, the fund must list
the acquisition date and acquisition cost. Id. § 210.12-12(8).
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Following the fund¶s assets are the fund¶s liabilities, and the
difference between the two is the fund¶s net assets. The net asset section
details the sources of the total fair value of the assets less any fund
liabilities. Net assets consist of paid-in capital and any undistributed net
investment income or loss, which in turn, should be broken out into
accumulated undistributed net investment income, accumulated
undistributed net realized gains or losses on investment transactions, and
net unrealized appreciation or depreciation in the value of investments at
the balance sheet date.114 The unrealized gain or loss in the net assets
section may not be exactly equal to the unrealized gain or loss in the fund¶s
investments because there can be included in net assets certain financial
contracts, such as forward and futures, or foreign currency transactions
that are not listed as investments.
A fund is required to state in a footnote its aggregate gross unrealized
appreciation for all securities in which there is a built-in gain (BIG); the
aggregate gross unrealized depreciation for which there is a built-in loss
(BIL); the net BIG or BIL, and the aggregate costs for tax purposes.115
These amounts are generally not exactly equal to the BIG or BIL listed in
the balance sheet because of certain differences between tax and financial
accounting in determining the cost basis of assets. For instance, temporary
or permanent book-tax differences that arise from the application of the
wash sales rules, the straddle rules, passive foreign investment company
rules, and in-kind redemption rules can cause the book and tax cost basis
and correlative gain or loss to diverge.116
The notes to the financial statements will disclose the gross amount
of any in-kind redemptions, the total shares redeemed, and the net gain or
loss realized on the in-kind redemptions. The following disclosure from
the Fidelity Blue Chip Growth Fund is typical:
Redemptions In-Kind. During the period, 1,878 shares of the Fund held
by unaffiliated entities were redeemed for cash and investments with a
value of $137,687. The net realized gain of $67,543 on investments
delivered through in-kind redemptions is included in the accompanying
Statement of Operations. The amount of in-kind redemptions is included
in share transactions in the accompanying Statement of Changes in Net

114. Id. § 210.6-04(17).
115. Id. § 210.12-12(8).
116. See, e.g., Fidelity Blue Chip Growth Fund, Annual Report (Form N-CSR) 35
(July 31, 2016) (³Book-tax differences are primarily due to foreign currency transactions,
passive foreign investment companies (PFIC), redemptions in kind, partnerships, deferred
trustees¶ compensation and losses deferred due to wash sales.´).
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Assets as well as Note 10: Share Transactions. The Fund recognized no
gain or loss for federal income tax purposes. 117

When the securities are distributed, any unrealized gain or loss
becomes realized for book purposes and is included as realized gain or loss
in the Statement of Operations.
This information allows a reader to determine roughly whether the
fund was distributing securities with greater or less realized gain or loss
than the fund assets generally. For instance, the Fidelity Blue Chip fund
owned at year-end securities worth $21,789,927,000 with a tax basis of
$14,424,327,000.118 The percentage of BIG in the distributed securities
was 49.1 percent ($67.5 million/$137.7 million), whereas the percentage
of BIG in the fund assets at year-end was 34 percent ($7.365 billion /
$21.789 billion).119
2. Taxation of In-kind Redemptions
Throughout the history of U.S. investment companies, in-kind
distributions have been exempt from tax at the fund level. As Congress
began to limit and finally prohibit in 1986 the tax-free distribution of
appreciated property by corporations, it continued to specifically exempt
open-end funds from this rule. There is scant discussion in the legislative
history for the justification for this exemption or why closed-end funds
were not also eligible. Perhaps the simplest explanation for the legislative
silence is that when § 852(b)(6) and its statutory predecessors were
enacted, in-kind distributions from open-end funds were rare.120 ETFs, for
which in-kind redemptions are part of their genome, were only first offered
in 1993, seven years after § 852(b)(6) was enacted.
Under current law, the tax consequences of a redeeming shareholder
of a mutual fund are straightforward. In the case of a cash redemption, the
redemption is treated as a sale or exchange under § 302(b)(5),121 and a
redeeming shareholder recognizes capital gain or loss determined by the

117. Id. at 37. Because the numbers in the excerpt are in thousands, the unrealized gain
in the distributed securities was approximately $67,543,000. See id.
118. Id. at 41.
119. This calculation is only approximate because it is not possible to know the BIG
or BIL in the fund¶s assets when the in-kind distributions were made. Also, the disclosure
does not separate the amount of cash that was distributed with the securities. Id. at 37.
120. In adopting Rule 18f-1, which permits a fund to elect to commit to make most
redemptions in cash, the SEC stated that ³redemptions in kind are extremely rare.´ Election
by Open-End Investment Companies To Make Only Cash Redemptions, 36 Fed. Reg.
11,919 (June 23, 1971).
121. See Stephen D. Fisher, RICs and the Retail Investor: A Marriage of Convenience
or Necessity?, 66 TAX LAW. 331, 371 (2013).

2017]

THE GREAT ETF TAX SWINDLE

25

difference between the value of any cash over the shareholder¶s adjusted
basis in the fund shares redeemed.122
Prior to the enactment of § 302(b)(5), it was possible that a
redemption by a mutual fund could have been treated as a dividend if the
shareholder did not completely redeem his or her shares. Generally, if a
minority shareholder¶s interest in a corporation completely terminates or
declines as a result of a redemption, the redemption will be treated as a
sale or exchange.123 If, however, a particular shareholder redeemed a
portion of his or her shares, but a larger shareholder simultaneously
redeemed a larger percentage of his or her shares, the smaller shareholder
could end up owning a larger percentage of the fund at the end of the day,
which would preclude redemption treatment as being essentially
equivalent to a dividend.124
In case of an in-kind redemption by an ETF, the fund-level treatment
is clear: under § 852(b)(6), the ETF does not recognize any gain or loss.125
The shareholder level treatment, however, is not entirely clear.
Section 302(b)(5) was enacted in 2010 to provide a bright-line rule
for redemptions from open-end funds because of the uncertainty of
applying the redemption rules of § 302(b)(1)±(4) to funds that offered
continuous redemption of shares.126 Section 302(b)(5), which mandates
sale or exchange treatment for redemptions, requires that the redeeming
fund ³issue[] only stock which is redeemable upon the demand of the
stockholder.´127 Although all shares presented in an ETF creation unit are
redeemable upon the demand of the AP (or another shareholder that has
assembled one or more creation units), outside of the creation unit

122. 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a)±(b) (2012).
123. Under U.S. v. Davis, for a redemption of stock to be treated as not essentially
equivalent to a dividend, the redemption must result in a ³meaningful reduction of the
shareholder¶s proportionate interest in the corporation.´ U.S. v. Davis, 397 U.S. 307, 313,
reh’g denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970). Generally, once a shareholder¶s interest declines
below 50 percent, any reduction in voting power is treated as a sale or exchange. See Rev.
Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92, at 5 (finding that reduction in a shareholder¶s ownership
interest from 0.0001118 percent to 0.0001081 percent should be treated as meaningful).
124. See Rev. Rul. 81-289, 1981-2 C.B. 82 (holding that for a redemption not to be
essentially equivalent to a dividend, a shareholder¶s voting interest, interest in the earnings
through dividends, or interest in the assets of the corporation upon liquidation must
decline). In this case, the shareholder¶s interest in all these items would increase.
125. If an ETF is an RIC and the securities are appreciated, § 852(b)(6) applies and no
gain is recognized. If the distributed securities have a BIL, they are covered by
§ 311(a), and no loss is recognized.
126. JOINT COMM¶N ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-49-10, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4337, THE ³REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANY MODERNIZATION
ACT OF 2010´ FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 20
(2010).
127. 26 U.S.C. § 302(b)(5)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
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redemption, ETF shares are not ordinarily redeemable upon the demand
of a stockholder.128
It may be appropriate to interpret ³redeemable upon the demand of
the stockholder´ in § 302(b)(5) as referring to shares of any open-end fund.
This identical language is found in § 852(b)(6) and its statutory antecedent,
former § 311(d)(1)(E). When those provisions were enacted, the language
was meant to apply to open-end (mutual) funds as opposed to closed-end
funds. Although ETFs did not exist when these provisions were enacted,
because ETFs are open-end funds they arguably should be able to benefit
from this provision.
If, however, that language is intended to track the definition of
³redeemable security´ under the 1940 Act,129 there may be an issue as
ETFs generally require an exemption from this definition in order to be
publicly offered.130 In an exemption application, the applicant typically
acknowledges that there is a question whether shares of an ETF that are
not individually redeemable satisfy the definition of ³redeemable security´
and consequently whether an ETF would be an open-end management
company.131 The SEC has proposed rules that would treat ETF shares as
redeemable securities under § 2 of the 1940 Act, but they have not yet been
finalized.132
Even if ETFs are not explicitly covered by § 302(b)(5), it is likely
that most redemptions of creation units would be treated as sales or
exchanges.133 If an AP redeemed completely from an ETF, the redemption
would be treated as a sale or exchange with the AP realizing gain or loss
based on the difference between the AP¶s adjusted basis in the redeemed
ETF shares and the value of the distributed securities and any cash.134 In
the case of a partial redemption, assuming that an AP owned less than 50
percent of a fund after it redeemed shares, the redemption should be treated

128. Section 302(b)(5) applies specifically to redemptions of stock of a publicly
offered RIC; an ETF would certainly be considered publicly traded under § 67(c)(2)(B).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (2012).
130. See, e.g., N. Tr. Invs., Inc., Application for Exemption and Other Relief Filed
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (40-APP/A) 41 (Aug. 22, 2011).
131. See id. (³Because Shares will not be individually redeemable, a possible question
arises as to whether the definitional requirements of a µredeemable security¶ or an µopenend company¶ under the 1940 Act would be met if such Shares are viewed as nonredeemable securities.´).
132. Under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 270.6c-11(a) (2008), ETF shares are considered
³redeemable securities´ for purposes of § 2(a)(32) of the 1940 Act.
133. This is the position of counsel to ETFs. See, e.g., SPDR S&P 500 ETF Tr., supra
note 63.
134. 26 U.S.C. § 302(b)(3) (2012).
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as not essentially equivalent to a dividend as the AP¶s interest in the fund
should decrease immediately after the redemption.135
Regardless of whether a redemption is treated as a sale or dividend,
the AP will take a FMV in the distributed securities.136 The shareholder¶s
holding period of the securities received will not tack to the fund¶s holding
period.137 Apart from the shareholder treatment of an in-kind redemption,
it is important to remember that the fund does not recognize gain or loss
upon the in-kind distribution of securities.138 Consequently, any BIG or
BIL in the distributed shares disappears at the fund level.
3. In-kind Redemptions and the Disappearance of Fund BIGs
When a RIC distributes property in kind in redemption of a
shareholder, the BIG or BIL in distributed securities disappears at no tax
cost or benefit to the non-redeeming shareholders. Contrast this result with
an actual sale of the securities and distribution of cash: if the sale generated
gains, those gains would either increase the taxable income or net capital
gains of all remaining shareholders; if the sale generated losses, those
losses would reduce taxable income, net capital gains, or increase capital
loss carryovers. For the redeeming shareholder, any relationship between
the BIG or BIL of the distributed securities and the gain or loss recognized
by the distributing shareholder is mere happenstance, because the fund
manager decides which securities to distribute to the redeeming
shareholder.
Because Subchapter M is a pass-through regime that is designed to
eliminate entity-level taxation of gains, why should a fund have to
recognize gain on the distribution of appreciated securities? The tax policy
concern is that the tax-free distribution of appreciated securities exploits a
structural weakness in Subchapter M, which is the failure to match taxable
gains of a fund to the economic gains of the fund¶s shareholders. The
distribution non-recognition rule permits non-redeeming shareholders
who own appreciated shares to unjustifiably defer tax on their economic
135. See supra text accompanying notes 124±27. There are certain scenarios in which
application of § 302(b)(1) is not clear. For example, assume that an AP redeems shares at
10:00 a.m. and reduces its interest in a fund from two percent to one percent, but two
minutes later it purchases additional shares so that its interest in the fund increases to 2.5
percent. Is a momentary reduction in the ownership of a fund sufficient to ensure that the
redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend? The application of the ³not
essentially equivalent to a dividend´ standard to these types of transactions is not clear.
136. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (2010). If the distribution were not treated as a sale or
exchange but instead as an ordinary distribution under § 301(a), the distributed securities
would take an FMV basis. 26 U.S.C. § 301(d) (2012).
137. See id. § 1223(2).
138. See id. § 852(b)(6).

28

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1

gains until they sell their shares, even though the securities of the fund that
gave rise to those gains have been distributed tax-free from the fund.
The following example demonstrates this phenomenon. Assume that
the ETF tracks the return of index A by holding a portfolio of the shares of
index A (portfolio A1, A2, etc.), the shares of portfolio A1 all increase or
decrease by the same percentage, and an AP can create a single share of
the ETF.
Example 1
AP contributes portfolio A1 with a value of $100 to an ETF in exchange
for a share, which is sold to a retail shareholder for $100. Over the year,
portfolio A1 appreciates by $100 to $200. At the end of the year, AP
contributes portfolio A2 (basis = $200; FMV = $200) to ETF in exchange
for a share with a NAV of $200. AP later requests to be redeemed, and
the ETF distributes portfolio A1, which has a basis of $100 and a FMV
of $200, to AP in redemption of its share.

The ETF does not recognize gain on the distribution of portfolio A1
under § 852(b)(6), and AP recognizes gain or loss based on the difference
between the adjusted basis (³AB´) of its ETF share ($200) and the FMV
of portfolio A1 ($200), or $0. This example also demonstrates that a
redeeming shareholder¶s gain has no necessary relationship to the BIG in
the distributed securities. Because the redeeming shareholder takes a FMV
basis in the distributed property, the BIG in portfolio A1 disappears at the
fund level.
The retail shareholder, however, still owns his ETF share with a basis
of $100 and a FMV of $200, but the $100 of economic gain that gave rise
to the increased NAV is not matched by the taxable BIG at the fund level.
In fact, in Example 1, after portfolio A1 is distributed, there is no remaining
BIG in the fund. Thus, even if the ETF immediately sold all its assets (in
this case, portfolio A2) for $200, it would not recognize any gains, and the
retail shareholder would not have any taxable income. The retail
shareholder will not recognize any gains until he disposes of his share.
This example clearly demonstrates the much-vaunted tax advantage
of ETFs.139 This advantage can be significant for fund shareholders. For
example, in 2015, the 25 largest equity ETFs distributed securities with
BIG of almost $60 billion.140 For 2015, the total capital gains distributed
by all equity funds was $331 billion.141 These 25 equity ETFs, however,
did not distribute any capital gains to their shareholders. The $60 billion
139. See supra text accompanying notes 5±6.
140. See Annex A. This is the gross BIG. Two funds distributed securities with net
BIL. The data shown is for the funds¶ taxable years that began in 2015.
141. FACT BOOK, supra note 4, at 201 tbl.30.
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of BIG in these distributed securities disappeared and will not be
recognized until the fund shareholders dispose of their shares.
The fund manager has the discretion to select which securities to
distribute in kind. If the goal is to reduce a fund¶s BIG and thereby
minimize future capital gains distributions, the manager will likely choose
to distribute low-basis (high BIG) shares.142 In the 25 funds listed in Annex
A, there was a total of $8 billion of BIL at year-end and a total of $60
billion of gross BIG distributed and only two funds distributed securities
with a net BIL.143 To reiterate, the gains in the distributed securities will
not be taxed to any remaining shareholder until the current shareholders
with BIG in their ETF shares sell their shares. If the shareholders do not
sell their shares, the gain is indefinitely deferred.
The exemption from tax on the distribution of appreciated property
is equivalent to treating the distribution as a taxable event to the fund but
exempting the recognized gains from entity-level tax. The ability to
eliminate fund-level capital gains by the tax-free distribution of
appreciated securities permits non-redeeming shareholders to obtain an
after-tax accumulation in their ETFs similar to the accumulation they
would earn if the ETF were held in a nondeductible IRA account, in other
words, no taxation until the shareholder withdraws from the account, in
this case a sale of the ETF shares.144 In fact, the ETF investment can
potentially generate a higher return than a nondeductible IRA because the
ETF shareholder will realize capital gains on the sale of the shares,
whereas a distribution from a nondeductible IRA is ordinary income.145
Moreover, it is even possible that all of the unrealized gains of the
distributed securities could have been short-term gains. Because the nonredeeming shareholders get the benefit of deferral, this allows them to turn
142. In Example 1, there was only one appreciated portfolio share basket, and it was
assumed that all the shares of the basket appreciated or depreciated by the same percentage.
More realistically, the ETF will own many baskets of shares, and each basket will have a
different amount of depreciation or appreciation. For instance, the ETF could hold various
shares of Apple stock and some shares could have appreciated in value and some
depreciated since they were contributed to the ETF. When a fund gets a request to redeem
from an AP to distribute a basket of securities including the Apple stock, the fund manager
has the valuable option to pick the Apple shares that have the greatest BIG.
143. See Annex A.
144. For the rules for nondeductible contributions to IRAs, see 26 U.S.C.
§ 408(o)(2)(B)(i) (2012). Distributions from an IRA to which nondeductible contributions
have been made are taxable as ordinary income to the extent that the distribution is not
attributable to the nondeductible contribution, which is received tax-free. Nondeductible
contributions are recovered in proportion to the ratio of nondeductible contributions held
in all IRAs at the end of the calendar year to the total balance of all IRAs at the end of the
calendar year. See id. § 408(d)(2)(C).
145. If an ETF pays out taxable income, for example, from dividends, however, the
return in an after-tax IRA could be greater than the return from holding the ETF directly.
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short-term gains at the ETF level into long-term gains at the shareholder
level. This result is certainly not a conscious tax policy decision but has
arisen because of the financial innovation of ETFs that relies on the
exploitation of a tax rule that was not originally intended to apply to RICs
except in rare circumstances.
D. Turbo Charging the § 852(b)(6) Exemption Rule
Market participants have developed new techniques that turbocharge
the § 852(b)(6) exemption by extending it far beyond its original intent.146
These techniques include creating a special ETF share class for mutual
funds, buying and holding briefly mutual fund shares that will be
redeemed with appreciated securities, and offering shares of a publicly
traded mutual fund with the option to redeem in-kind creation shares.
Vanguard, the second largest asset manager with approximately $4
trillion of AUM,147 offers 70 ETFs and is one of the most aggressive
beneficiaries of § 852(b)(6). In 2015, Vanguard had 8 of the largest 25
equity ETFs, these funds distributed securities with BIG of $23.6 billion,
and the Vanguard Total Stock Market Fund alone distributed securities
with BIG of $11.7 billion.148
Unlike other ETFs, Vanguard¶s ETFs are a separate share class of a
Vanguard index mutual fund, but with the normal limitations and benefits
associated with typical ETFs, e.g., continuous trading at market price only
on an exchange, and redemption rights only for APs.149 When ETF shares
are redeemed, the mutual fund can distribute appreciated securities
without the recognition of gain under § 852(b)(6), which benefits not only
the ETF shareholders but also the mutual fund shareholders.150 On the
other hand, this structure may be slightly less efficient than regular ETFs
because cash redemptions by mutual fund shareholders could generate
146. These techniques have been noted by other commentators. See Sheppard, supra
note 25, at 1240; Robert Gordon, ETF’s Secret Sauce, TWENTY-FIRST SECURITIES
CORPORATION 2, http://www.twenty-first.com/pdf/ETFs_Secret_Sauce.pdf.
147. Sarah Krouse, Vanguard Reaches $4 Trillion for the First Time, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
10, 2017, 6:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguardreaches-4-trillion-for-firsttime-1486745349.
148. For a complete list of Vanguard¶s ETFs, see Vanguard ETF List, ETFDB.COM,
http://etfdb.com/issuer/vanguard/#etfs&sort_name=assets_under_management&sort_ord
er=desc&page=3 (last visited July 15, 2017). For the BIG of the Vanguard funds, see
Annex A.
149. For a description and overview of the Vanguard ETF shares, see Vanguard U.S.
Stock ETFs Prospectus (Form N1-A, filed as 485BPOS) 67±68 (Apr. 27, 2016).
150. Vanguard explicitly touts this benefit. Common ETF Questions, VANGUARD,
https://investor.vanguard.com/etf/faqs?lang=en (last visited Mar. 21, 2017) (³Vanguard
ETFs can also use in-kind redemptions to remove stocks that have greatly increased in
value (which trigger large capital gains) from their holdings.´).
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capital gains for ETF holders. Vanguard has obtained a patent for this
structure,151 which has forced other mutual fund families to devise other
structures for turbocharging § 852(b)(6).152
Another strategy to turbocharge § 852(b)(6) is being employed by
ReFlow Fund LLC, which provides liquidity to mutual funds experiencing
net redemptions of their shares.153 A fund that experiences net redemptions
may be forced to sell securities to generate cash to pay redeeming
shareholders. When a fund sells securities, it incurs trading costs, which
are borne by the remaining shareholders, and the security sales may also
generate taxable gains for the remaining shareholders.
A fund participating in the ReFlow program may draw down funds
from ReFlow when the fund experiences net sales,154 and the fund then
uses the ReFlow capital to pay redeeming shareholders to minimize fund
transaction costs, such as brokerage fees and taxable gains. Instead of
structuring the transaction as a loan to the mutual fund, however, ReFlow
advances capital to the fund by actually purchasing shares of the fund,
which uses the proceeds to pay redeeming shareholders.155 Thus,
ReFlow¶s investment is not used to purchase securities in the fund.
The typical fund disclosure states that ReFlow will request
redemption of its shares when the fund experiences net sales, at the end of
a maximum holding period determined by ReFlow, which is generally one
month, or at ReFlow¶s discretion.156 Importantly, ReFlow may request
redemption in kind, which permits the fund to distribute appreciated
securities to satisfy the redemption request.157 ReFlow specifically
advertises this as being a benefit of participating in the ReFlow liquidity

151. U.S. Patent No. 6,879,964 B2 (issued Apr. 12, 2005).
152. Ari I. Weinberg, Firms Try Varied Designs to Add ETFs, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3,
2013,
4:47
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873246244
04578255940811549604 (describing master-feeder structure).
153. A fund¶s relationship with ReFlow can be found in the fund¶s prospectus and
payments to ReFlow are sometimes disclosed in a fund¶s annual statement. See, e.g., Eaton
Vance Special Inv. Tr., Prospectus (Form N-1A) 91 (Mar. 1, 2017) (detailing the fund¶s
participation in ReFlow Liquidity Program) [hereinafter Eaton N-1A].
154. Id. (³ReFlow provides participating mutual funds with a source of cash to meet
net shareholder redemptions by standing ready each business day to purchase fund shares
up to the value of the net shares redeemed by other shareholders that are to settle the next
business day.´).
155. ReFlow received a no-action letter from the SEC in 2002 regarding its program.
ReFlow represented to the SEC that it requires a fund¶s board of directors to show that it
approved of the fund¶s participation and specifically found that the fund¶s participation
was in the best interest of the fund and its shareholders. See ReFlow Fund, LLC, SEC NoAction Letter, 2002 WL 1493234 (July 15, 2002).
156. Eaton N-1A, supra note 153, at 91.
157. Id.
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program.158 In exchange for providing the liquidity, ReFlow receives a fee
that is determined under an auction process.159
The purported benefits to a fund of using ReFlow include: a reduction
of a fund¶s trading costs that would be incurred to sell securities to satisfy
redemption requests, cheaper cost of short-term borrowing, a reduction in
the amount of cash a fund must hold to satisfy redemption requests, and
the ability to distribute appreciated securities in satisfaction of ReFlow¶s
redemption requests.160
The ReFlow shares function similarly to the creation shares of an
ETF: they operate as a mechanism to distribute appreciated securities to
ReFlow and thereby help a fund lower its potential future tax liabilities.
Unlike an AP, however, which both contributes and receives securities,
ReFlow only contributes cash that is never used to purchase securities but
receives securities when it redeems. The ReFlow investment does not
seem to aid in price discovery.
The newest variation on turbocharging § 852(b)(6) is the launch of
NextShares by Eaton Vance, which are exchange-traded managed funds
that combine various structural elements of mutual funds and ETFs.161
Unlike most ETFs, which generally follow passive strategies, NextShares
are shares of actively managed portfolios. Consequently, they do not
disclose their current portfolio positions.
Like ETFs, retail shareholders purchase and sell NextShares on an
exchange, but cannot request redemption of their shares from the
underlying fund. Unlike ETFs, however, the price at which the shares will
trade will be at the fund¶s next daily NAV plus or minus a market-

158. See Redemption Service, REFLOW, https://www.reflow.com/redemptionservice.php (last visited July 15, 2017).
159. The fee is calculated based on a Dutch auction process, and, according to ReFlow,
the minimum bid is 20 basis points. See id. For a description of the auction process, see
Letter from Douglas J. Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. of the Div. of Inv. Mgmt., to the SEC 4±10
(July 12, 2002) (requesting no enforcement action for participation in the ReFlow Share
Auction Program). The in-kind redemption feature was not discussed in the no-action letter
request or SEC reply.
160. It appears that while it is a shareholder, ReFlow bears the risk of a drop in the
value of its shares. To protect against a drop in the fund¶s NAV, ReFlow could hedge its
exposure to fund price movements. For example, if ReFlow somehow knows the securities
it will receive when it redeems its shares, it could short the securities when the investment
is made and upon redemption of the fund shares, deliver the in-kind shares it received from
the fund to close out the short sale. There may be other mechanisms for ReFlow to hedge
its exposure.
161. Eaton Vance NextShares Tr., Prospectus (Form N-1A) amend. no. 5, 4±5 (Dec.
10, 2015). Eaton Vance received an exemption letter from the SEC to offer NextShares.
See Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 31,361, 110 SEC Docket 2202, 2014
WL 6768923 (Dec. 2, 2014).
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determined premium or discount that may vary during the trading day.162
There is thus no opportunity to trade NextShares at intra-day prices. The
premium or discount is determined by various market factors, including
the supply and demand for shares, transaction costs, and the competition
among market makers.163 In contrast, the price at which ETF shares trade
does not necessarily reflect NAV, but instead reflects the supply and
demand for the ETF shares.
Like ETFs, only APs can create or redeem their NextShares directly
with the fund,164 and redemptions are primarily on an in-kind basis.165 This
feature permits the fund to use the redemption of the NextShares as a
vehicle to distribute appreciated securities and thereby lower the mutual
fund¶s future capital gains for its current and future shareholders.
Eaton Vance touts the ability to distribute appreciated securities
through the in-kind redemption process and reduce future capital gains
distributions as being a valuable characteristic of NextShares.166 Since
their launch only two years ago, at least 14 other investment managers
have announced that they have entered into preliminary agreements with
Eaton Vance to offer NextShares.167
These financial innovations by investment managers have
turbocharged § 852(b)(6) far beyond its original intent and are being used
to undermine the basic principles of Subchapter M by eliminating capital
gains tax at the fund level. Shareholders in such funds are only taxed on
income distributions and on the sale of their fund shares. This creates a
wedge between the tax treatment of ETFs, the funds that use ReFlow, the
funds that offer NextShares and regular mutual funds, offshore mutual
funds, and other U.S. collective investment vehicles. Various options to
eliminate this wedge are discussed below.168
E. The Divide between Inside and Outside Basis
One major structural weakness of Subchapter M is its failure to match
the inside basis of a fund¶s assets with the outside basis of the fund¶s
shareholders. Consequently, the BIG of the fund oftentimes has no relation
162. Notice of Application for Exemption Order, Investment Company Act of 1940
Release No. 31,333, 110 SEC Docket 1013, 2014 WL 5768701, at *3 (Nov. 6, 2014). For
example, for a trade executed during the day, the next daily NAV would be the NAV at the
end of the day.
163. Id. at *3 n.10.
164. Eaton Vance NextShares Tr., supra note 161.
165. Notice of Application for Exemption Order, 2014 WL 5768701, at *3.
www.nextshares.com/
166. See
Introducing
NextShares,
NEXTSHARES,
introducing.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
167. See id.
168. See infra Part III.
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to the BIG of the fund¶s shareholders. In Example 1, after the AP redeems
its share, the total inside basis is $200 and the BIG is $0, but the total
outside basis and shareholder BIG is $100. As demonstrated in Example
1, the ability to distribute tax-free appreciated property in redemption of a
shareholder exacerbates the divide between inside and outside basis. The
failure to match inside and outside basis also accounts for the possibility
that new shareholders can be taxed on fund capital gains that arose before
the shareholders entered the fund.
A shareholder purchases shares of a mutual fund at the fund¶s
NAV.169 For an ETF, the shareholder purchases shares at the market price,
which presumably is close to the fund¶s NAV because of the creation and
redemption activities of APs.170 The purchase price establishes the
shareholder¶s basis in his or her fund shares. The shareholder¶s basis in his
or her shares (outside basis) may significantly diverge from the
shareholder¶s proportionate interest of the fund¶s basis in its assets (inside
basis) because the fund¶s assets may have appreciated or depreciated since
the date the assets were purchased and the date the shareholder enters the
fund.
Example 2
A fund has one shareholder who owns one share of the fund with a basis
of $50 and a FMV of $100, and the fund owns one share of Google with
a basis of $50 and a FMV of $100. If a new shareholder purchases a share
of the fund for $100, the fund¶s NAV, the new shareholder¶s basis in the
fund share would be $100, but his or her share of inside basis, which is
the sum of the basis of the Google share and cash, would be $75 (50
percent * $150).

If the fund sells the share of Google for $100 immediately after the
new shareholder has entered the fund, the fund will realize gains of $50,
and to avoid entity-level tax, it must distribute $25 to each shareholder.171
The new shareholder, however, when he or she purchased the fund share
for $100, economically paid for his or her share of the unrealized gain in
the share of Google.

169. A fund may not offer to exchange its securities for anything other than its NAV
without SEC approval. 15 U.S.C § 80a-11 (2012); 17 C.F.R. §270-22c-1(a) (2017)
(requiring redemption or purchase price to be at the current NAV which is next computed
after the redemption or purchase request).
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. In this example, it does not matter whether the capital gain is short-term or longterm, because it is the only income of the fund. For a taxable shareholder, however, whether
the gain is short-term or long-term will matter.
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In this example, even though the fund¶s assets did not appreciate
since the new shareholder entered the fund, the new shareholder will be
taxed on his or her share of the fund¶s existing BIG. The new shareholder
is in essence taxed on his or her capital and not on the return on his or her
capital. The fund¶s NAV will decline to $75 after it distributes the gain as
a dividend, but the shareholder¶s basis remains at $100 because a
shareholder is not permitted to reduce the basis of his or her shares when
receiving a distribution of a capital gain dividend or a distribution of
ICTI.172 The tax surprises can arise even for shareholders who have long
holding periods if the fund¶s economic gains arose prior to the purchase of
their shares.
The fund shareholder only recoups this tax on this phantom income
when the shareholder sells his or her shares. For instance, immediately
after the dividend, the shareholder could redeem his or her shares for $75
and recognize a $25 loss to offset the $25 of phantom gain.173 The sale,
however, could trigger a redemption fee, and to avoid application of the
wash sales rules, the shareholder would have to invest in another fund or
wait more than 30 days to reinvest in the same fund.174 Subchapter M could
thus encourage shareholders to sell in order to avoid being temporarily
overtaxed and not because they have changed their views of the mutual
fund investment. The tax system surely should not encourage such
behavior.175
A similar mismatch occurs when a shareholder purchases shares of a
fund with a net BIL in its assets.

172. 26 U.S.C. § 301(c)(1) (2012) (requiring distributions from corporations that
constitute dividends to be included in income); id. § 301(c)(2) (requiring that distributions
in excess of current and accumulated earnings and profits (E&P) reduce a shareholder¶s
basis in his stock).
173. When the fund pays the dividend, its NAV will drop by the amount of the
dividend.
174. Id. § 1091. For a discussion of the application of the wash sales rules to mutual
funds, see Daniel W. Matthews, Tax Loss Harvesting: Can Robo-Advisers Navigate Wash
Sale Rule?, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 3, 2017).
175. This rule could be used affirmatively by shareholders. Assume that a shareholder
has long-term capital losses (LTCLs) that he cannot use (or that will offset favorably taxed
long-term capital gains (LTCGs). A shareholder could purchase a mutual fund that was
going to make a distribution of NCGs and use the gains to eliminate the LTCLs. The losses
now would be reflected in the shares of the mutual fund. The shareholder could then sell
the shares of the fund and generate a short-term capital loss (STCL). Through this gambit,
the shareholder would have succeeded in converting LTCLs into STCLs, which could be
used to offset short-term capital gains (STCGs). To prevent this, § 852(b)(4) converts any
STCL on the sale of a mutual fund held for six months or less into LTCL to the extent that
a shareholder has received a capital gains dividend.

36

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1

Example 3
A fund has one shareholder who owns one share of the fund with a basis
of $100 and a FMV of $50, and the fund owns one share of Google, with
a basis of $100 and a FMV of $50. If a new shareholder purchases a share
of the fund for $50, the fund¶s NAV, the new shareholder¶s basis in the
fund share would be $50, but his or her share of inside basis would be
$75 (50 percent * $150).

When the fund sells the share for $50, it will recognize a loss of $50.
Although the fund cannot pass through the loss to shareholders, the loss
can be carried forward and offset $50 of future gains. For instance, assume
the fund purchases an asset for $50, and it subsequently appreciates to
$100, at which time the fund sells it for a gain of $50. Because the fund
can offset the $50 of gain with the $50 capital loss carryover (CLCO), the
fund will not have any income to distribute, although its NAV will increase
from $50 to $75.
In this case, the new shareholder has invested $50, the fund had an
economic and tax gain of $50 since the investment ($25 of which is
economically attributable to the new shareholder), but because the tax gain
is offset by the realized BIL that existed prior to the investment by the
shareholder, the shareholder will not pay tax on the economic gain until
he sells his shares.176 In this case, the mismatch between inside and outside
basis inappropriately permits deferral of a fund¶s economic gain.
These tax phenomena are well known in the mutual fund tax and
finance literature and the financial popular press. For nascent shareholders,
the standard advice given in the financial popular press to avoid temporary
double taxation is to forego investing in a fund prior to the fund¶s exdividend date if the fund is planning to make a substantial distribution.177
The financial press has also noted that it can be beneficial to invest in funds
with CLCOs because subsequently realized gains will not be taxed at the
shareholder level until the CLCOs are extinguished.178
There are other self-help strategies available to shareholders to avoid
being taxed on non-economic gains. For instance, a shareholder could
redeem his shares before the record date. Mutual funds typically give
176. The same result occurs if the fund has an existing CLCO that can be used to offset
future gains.
177. See, e.g., Christine Benz, Dos and Don’ts for Mutual Fund Capital Gains Season,
MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 24, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://news.morningstar.com/
articlenet/article.aspx?id=715686.
178. See, e.g., Carolyn T. Geer, The Bright Side of Past Fund Losses, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
4, 2011), http://goo.gl/SpVvXS. Because a fund can only use CLCOs against subsequently
realized capital gains, a fund can generate ICTI and hence taxable dividends even though
it has unused CLCOs.
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estimates of a distribution a few months in advance of the dividend record
date, so a shareholder will have some idea of the potential gains and
income he or she will receive. If the distributions were going to be
excessive or represented gains that were not reflected in his or her
economic returns, a fund shareholder could redeem his or her shares prior
to the record date.179
This strategy has its limits. A redemption would require a shareholder
to recognize gain or loss on shares redeemed.180 If the fund had economic
gains since the shareholder had invested, the shareholder would be taxed
on those gains, whether they were realized by the fund. This strategy
seems only to make sense if the realized gains exceed the increase in NAV.
That would suggest that the shareholder was being allocated preacquisition gains. As noted above, such sales could trigger a redemption
fee, and any loss could be disallowed if the wash sales rules applied.181
This behavior also harms other shareholders because the redemption
request may require the fund to sell securities to pay the redeeming
shareholder. This selling could generate additional net capital gains
(NCGs) that would be allocated to remaining shareholders and thereby
potentially exacerbate the allocation of NCGs to shareholders who may
not have benefited from them (or already paid for them when they
purchased their shares).
A fund¶s taxable BIG or BIL in its assets is not easy to discover as it
requires a deep dive into the footnotes of detailed financial filings.182 The
SEC did not address overhang (the amount of a fund¶s BIG) when it
modified the rules requiring disclosures of after-tax returns in 2001.183
Fund managers have historically paid attention to a fund¶s overhang
because a significant amount of overhang dissuades investors from
moving into the fund until the BIG is reduced.184 Because fund managers

179. The record date is generally one day before payment date. To avoid being a
shareholder on the record date, the shareholder would have to request redemption of her
shares on or before the record date to avoid the dividend. RICs can generally only distribute
LTCGs once every 12 months. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 270-19b-1(a)
(2017).
180. Regardless of whether all or just a portion of the shares were redeemed, the
redemption would be treated as a sale or exchange. 26 U.S.C. § 302(b)(5) (2012) (treating
redemption of shares of a publicly traded RIC as a sale or exchange).
181. The wash sales rules would disallow any realized loss on the sold shares if the
shareholder reinvested in the same fund within 30 days. Id. § 1091.
182. See supra Part II.C.1.
183. Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns, Exchange Act Release No. 337941, 74 SEC Docket 236 (Jan. 18, 2001).
184. See Michael Barclay, Neil D. Pearson & Michael S. Weisbach, Open-End Mutual
Funds and Capital-Gains Taxes, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 30, 33 (1998) (finding evidence that
managers reduce overhang to attract new investors).
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are generally compensated on the basis of AUM, a significant amount of
BIG could be an impediment to investments by new taxable shareholders,
which increases AUM, and thereby potentially lowers managers¶
compensation. Managers historically have therefore undertaken to reduce
BIG.185
Fund annual reports contain information that lists a fund¶s tax BIG,
usually in the notes to the financial statements.186 In addition, independent
mutual fund reporting services, such as Morningstar and Lipper, disclose
a fund¶s BIG. Morningstar denominates this as ³potential capital gains
exposure´ (PCGE). This figure can be negative if the fund has reported
losses, which cannot be passed through to shareholders but which can be
used to offset future taxable gains. As Morningstar points out, this figure
is represented by a fraction of total capital gains divided by assets. Thus,
if a fund¶s assets shrink because of redemptions, but the total BIG does
not change, this fraction can significantly increase.187 In theory, it could
go to one.
Because Subchapter M adopts a modified entity-level tax regime,
albeit with modifications to eliminate double taxation, it creates a divide
between the inside basis of a fund¶s assets and the outside basis of the
fund¶s shareholders. This division can lead to temporary double taxation
of the same economic income and temporary double tax benefits from the
same economic losses. The exemption from tax on the unrealized gains of
securities distributed to redeeming shareholders further exacerbates the
divide between inside and outside basis and permits the deferral of gain by
non-redeeming shareholders and the conversion of short-term gains into
long-term gains. This exemption has the effect of eliminating fund-level
capital gains solely for ETFs and limiting ETF shareholder taxation solely
to those shareholders who sell. There seems to be no articulated policy
reason for this exemption.
III. FIXING THE IN-KIND REDEMPTION EXEMPTION
This Part considers various alternatives to the current rule that
permits ETFs to make tax-free distributions of appreciated property. Some
of the alternatives could be implemented within the current framework of
Subchapter M, while others, drawing from the rules applicable to
partnerships, would necessitate a substantial modification or possible
repeal of Subchapter M.

185. Id.
186. See supra Part II.C.1.
187. See generally Potential Capital Gain Exposure, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 25, 2005),
admainnew.morningstar.com/directhelp/Methodology_PCGE.pdf.
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The turbocharged use of § 852(b)(6) to eliminate fund-level gains
permits non-redeeming shareholders to defer taxation until they dispose of
their ETF shares. This result is largely equivalent to exempting the gains
of ETFs from tax. Various commentators have advocated such an
approach for all fund-level gains.188 If that is a conscious policy decision
by Congress, Subchapter M should be revised to explicitly extend this
same result to all RICs, instead of solely permitting ETFs to benefit from
the in-kind distribution exemption.
Exempting RICs from fund-level gains, however, would be a poor
policy decision because it would encourage investors to move into RICs
solely to avail themselves of the tax benefits. Moreover, the tax benefits
could eventually end up being captured by fund families. Exempting fundlevel gains from tax would move Subchapter M away from its original
goal of establishing tax parity between direct investments in securities and
investments in RICs.
The in-kind exemption for distribution of appreciated property from
RICs is inconsistent with the original aim of Subchapter M, which was to
provide smaller shareholders of RICs with roughly the same tax treatment
had they held the RIC¶s securities directly. Section 852(b)(6), however,
gives ETFs¶ shareholders a much better tax treatment than holding the
shares directly. Section 852(b)(6) should just be repealed.
But even though there does not seem to be any clearly articulated tax
policy for retaining the tax exemption for in-kind distributions, it is
possible that taxing such redemptions could raise non-tax issues. There is
a strongly held belief that the ability to make in-kind redemptions is an
important relief valve for open-end funds. In-kind redemptions, the
argument goes, could assist in dampening market volatility if mutual fund
shareholders rushed en masse to redeem their shares for cash. As the
Commissioner of the SEC recently stated: ³Although in-kind redemptions
are rarely made, the ability of an investment company to make
redemptions in this manner is important because the sale of sizable blocks
of securities to effect redemptions in cash would have the tendency to
depress the market price of those securities.´189
One could question whether the ability to distribute securities in kind
would provide such a benefit. If a significant percentage of shareholders

188. See Brunson, supra note 25, at 160 (recommending that investors be able to
exclude up to ten percent of their dividend income from mutual funds from the investors¶
taxable income); Coates, supra note 25, at 614 (discussing mutual fund reforms including
the elimination of corporate capital gains); Travis, supra note 25, at 848±57 (arguing that
fund shareholders should not be taxed on reinvested capital gains, but only when shares
are sold or non-capital gain dividends received).
189. Piwowar, supra note 14.
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redeemed and received securities instead of cash, one could posit that these
same shareholders would rush to sell the securities received. Also, it seems
reasonable to assume that these shareholders would be less skilled in
selling the securities in an orderly fashion than a fund manager, and such
unskilled selling could exacerbate volatility.190 Thus, whether the fund or
the fund¶s shareholders sell the securities should be irrelevant.
A related argument has been proffered by tax commentators to justify
the tax exemption for in-kind distributions. They argue that taxing in-kind
redemptions would undermine the in-kind relief valve of the 1940 Act
because RICs could be forced to either make additional redemptions of
property (potentially triggering the recognition of more gains) or
distributions of cash raised by the sale of securities, which could also
generate more gains.191
This argument too suffers from unquestioned assumptions. In the
case of market distress, the price of the fund¶s securities will also drop and
unrealized gains will tend to disappear. Similarly, if the redemption
requests are triggered by poor fund performance, it is unlikely that the fund
will have significant unrealized gains in its securities, and therefore the
fund would not have to sell additional assets to generate cash to pay
dividends to fund shareholders. Finally, if in-kind redemptions were
taxable, the fund manager still would have the choice either to sell assets
with no BIG or assets with BIL or the fund manager could distribute assets
with a small amount of BIG²all actions which would mitigate any tax
consequences to non-redeeming shareholders.
Another argument against repealing § 852(b)(6) focuses on the
changing tax status of fund shareholders. Because tax-exempt retirement
plans own an increasing share of RICs, the tax policy concerns raised by
tax-free distributions may become less relevant.192 At the end of 2015,
IRAs and defined contributions plans (§§ 401(k) and 403(b)) owned 46
percent of total mutual fund assets.193 There is no similar data for ETFs,
although the percentage of ETFs currently held in retirement accounts is
probably significantly less.194 Institutional investors, such as pension funds
190. Laura Sanders & Sarah Krouse, Clients Pull Cash From Valeant Investor, Get
Stock Instead, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2016, 5:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
clients-pull-cash-from-valeant-investor-get-stock-instead-1460131047.
191. See JOHNSTON & BROWN, supra note 15, at ¶ 3.06[2][c]; Hodaszy, supra note 25,
at 598.
192. For a discussion of the consequences of mixing taxable and tax-exempt
shareholders in mutual funds, see Jeffrey M. Colon, Oil and Water: Mixing Taxable and
Tax-Exempt Shareholders in Mutual Funds, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 773 (2014).
193. FACT BOOK, supra note 4, at 233将34 tbls.63 & 64.
194. Trang Ho, The Debate Over ETFs in 401(k) Plans, INSTITUTIONAL INV¶R (Apr.
11, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3330107/Asset-Management-
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and sovereign wealth funds, which are tax exempt, own a significant and
increasing percentage of ETF assets.195 Because mutual funds currently do
not raise the same issues regarding tax-free distributions as ETFs,
however, the tax concerns for ETFs persist.
A. Imposing Limits on the Basis of Distributed Securities
An approach that could be applied within the current framework of
Subchapter M is to tie the basis of the securities distributed in a redemption
to the percentage of securities distributed. This is equivalent to limiting
the BIG or BIL of the distributed securities to the percentage of securities
distributed.
The IRS has issued private letter rulings to closed-end funds
permitting them to distribute appreciated securities through in-kind tender
offers without the recognition of gain under § 852(b)(6).196 Because
closed-end funds do not issue redeemable securities, they do not fall within
the scope of § 852(b)(6), which requires that the distribution be ³in
redemption of its stock upon the demand of its shareholder.´197 The funds
had applied for exemptive relief from the SEC to redeem their shares in
order to reduce the discount to NAV in the fund shares, and some of the
funds claimed that the in-kind redemptions were more beneficial than cash
redemptions because cash redemptions would require the fund to sell
illiquid assets that would ³likely . . . yield depressed sales prices.´198
The rulings justify applying § 852(b)(6) on the basis that the ³policy
concerns underlying § 852(b)(6) that are applicable to an open-end fund

Indexing-and-ETFs/The-Debate-over-ETFs-in-401k-Plans.html#.WWoYAIqQy34
(stating that ETFs have been slow to catch on with retirement plans because of costs and
lack of revenue sharing). This may change as large retirement plan providers begin to
establish retirement plan platforms that incorporate ETFs as investment options. See, e.g.,
Todd Shriber, Schwab Debuts Low-Cost 401(k) ETF Program, ETF TRENDS (Feb. 5, 2014,
12:53 PM), www.etftrends.com/2014/02/schwab-debuts-low-cost-401k-etf-program.
195. Andrew McCollum, ETFs: “Active” Tools for Institutional Portfolios,
GREENWICH ASSOCS. 3 (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.ishares.com/us/literature/brochure/
2016-greenwich-research-associates-en-us.pdf (stating that a sample of institutional
investors showed that 21 percent of their total assets were invested in ETFs in 2016 and 19
percent in 2015).
196. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-09-013 (Nov. 17, 2004) (permitting
distributions of appreciated securities to redeeming shareholders from closed-end funds).
197. The rulings typically note that § 852(b)(6) does not define the term ³redemption
upon demand,´ but recognize that the better interpretation is that § 852(b)(6) is intended to
cover open-end RICs based on legislative history to § 162(k)(2)(B). Id.; see H.R. REP. NO.
99-841, at II-168 (1986). Under § 162(k)(2)(B), mutual funds are exempted from the rule
that prohibits a corporation from deducting any expenses related to the reacquisition of its
stock.
198. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-480-030 (Aug. 28, 2001).
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are therefore also applicable to [the fund requesting relief].´199 The noted
policy concerns are that the fund ³would be exposed to the market risk of
disadvantageous sale price and to the risk of potential depletion of its
holdings if it were required to sell assets to the meet the redemption
requests.´200
This rationale is not too convincing, because the holdings of a fund
are equally depleted if cash is distributed. An in-kind redemption merely
shifts selling costs from the fund to the shareholder. As discussed above,
mutual funds very rarely distribute securities in kind and thus must obtain
the cash to satisfy redemption requests from a sale of securities, cash
reserves, or borrowed funds.201 The unarticulated rationale may have been
that if distributions were taxable, the fund would have to sell other
securities to distribute to shareholders as a dividend to avoid entity-level
taxation. Those dividends would deplete the fund¶s assets, and unlike
mutual funds, closed-end funds do not have a simple mechanism to raise
additional assets.
The IRS made a policy decision to extend § 852(b)(6) to any RIC,
albeit with certain limitations that are not applicable to open-end fund
redemptions, including ETFs. The IRS imposed on ruling applicants the
requirement that the funds distribute a pro rata share of each of its
securities where the ratio of the aggregate tax basis of the distributed
securities to the total aggregate tax basis of the RIC¶s securities prior to
redemption is approximately equal to the percentage of the RIC¶s
securities being distributed.202 This requirement ensures that a redeeming
shareholder take securities with BIG or BIL proportionate to his or her
shareholdings.203

199. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-09-013 (Nov. 17, 2004).
200. Id.
201. See supra Part II.C.
202. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-09-013 (Nov. 17, 2004). The IRS private letter
ruling states:
[S]ecurities distributed will have an aggregate tax basis that, as a percentage of
the Fund¶s aggregate tax basis in all its assets prior to the redemption, is no more
than one percentage point lower than the percentage of the Fund¶s aggregate tax
basis in all its assets prior to the redemption, is no more than 1 percentage point
lower than the percentage of the assets that are being distributed by the Fund.
Id. There are certain exceptions for restricted and unregistered securities. Some of the
rulings state that following this approach, a redemption will ³neither defer the recognition
of gain to Fund¶s nonredeeming shareholders nor permit the disproportionate deferral of
tax at Fund¶s level.´ I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-14-043 (Apr. 2, 2004).
203. Another way to see how this restriction caps the total unrealized gain that can be
distributed is to note that inside a fund, NAV ± Basis = BIG (BIL). If X percent of the NAV
is being distributed and X percent of the basis is being distributed, then X percent of the
BIG (BIL) is also being distributed.
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Applying this approach to Example 1 above, because 50 percent of
the assets are distributed ($200/$400) to AP, the fund could distribute
securities with a basis of $150, which is equal to 50 percent of the total
aggregate tax basis of the ETF¶s securities²the sum of $100 of the basis
of portfolio A1 and $200 basis of A2 contributed to the ETF. After the
distribution of $200 of securities with a basis of $150, the fund owns
securities with a basis of $150 and a value of $200.
Although this approach reduces the BIG that can be removed tax-free
from a fund, it still fails to tax all the appreciation in a fund¶s securities to
the shareholder who has economically benefited from it. Note that if the
fund sold the remaining securities for $200, it would have $50 of gain,
which would be allocated and presumably distributed to the retail
shareholder. Because the fund would now hold cash of $150, there would
be no further gain at the fund level to be taxed to the retail shareholder.
The shareholder¶s basis in his fund shares, however, remains $100, and
the shareholder will be taxed on the remaining gain only when he sells his
shares.
More importantly, each time a shareholder is redeemed, he or she
removes a percentage of BIG tax-free from a fund equal to his or her
ownership interest in the fund and regardless of the BIG in his or her
shares. The percentage of BIG that can be removed is directly proportional
to the total percentage of shares that are redeemed. In the case of an ETF,
which continually issues and redeems shares, the continual redemption of
shareholders permits a growing percentage of BIG to be removed.
A related approach would limit the BIG a manager could distribute
to the BIG a redeeming shareholder has in its shares. Returning to Example
1, the fund manager in this case would be required to distribute to AP
securities with a BIG of $0 and a basis of $200, which is the AP¶s basis in
its ETF share. The ETF would retain securities with a basis of $100 and a
value of $200, leaving the $100 of gain for the retail shareholder. Even if
this proposal were limited to APs, it is not clear how the fund would know
an AP¶s basis in the shares presented for redemption unless the AP
disclosed that information to the manager.
This approach mitigates to some extent the problem of BIG stripping
by APs, but it still does not resolve the failure of Subchapter M to match
inside and outside basis for non-redeeming shareholders. For instance, if
the retail shareholder sold its shares to a new retail shareholder for $200,
the ETF¶s inside basis would remain at $100 and the NAV at $200, but
that economic gain was recognized by the selling retail shareholder.
Again, if the ETF sold the securities of A1, the new retail shareholder
would be taxed on the $100 of gain. Requiring further recognition of gain
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when those securities are sold results in temporary double taxation for the
new retail shareholder.
B. Repealing § 852(b)(6)
An obvious solution to the problem highlighted above is to simply
repeal § 852(b)(6) and subject all distributions of appreciated property to
§ 311(b). Because Subchapter M, following corporate tax principles,
generally does not attempt to match inside and outside basis or to allocate
gains and losses at the fund level to the shareholders who have
economically benefited from or borne the burden of such gains or losses
when appreciated assets leave the fund, gain or loss should be recognized
when assets are distributed.204
As shown in Example 1 above, the current regime permitting tax-free
distributions under § 852(b)(6) inappropriately removes and eliminates
fund-level gains. Although gains are preserved at the shareholder level, §
852(b)(6) permits the removal tax-free of the fund-level gains that gave
rise to the appreciation and thus allows shareholders to defer shareholderlevel gain until they dispose of their shares.205
If § 852(b)(6) were repealed, some of the tax benefits of investing in
ETFs would certainly diminish. Each time an ETF distributed appreciated
securities, taxable gains would be generated for all remaining
shareholders. One of the touted tax benefits of ETFs is the de-linkage
between the tax consequences to redeeming shareholders and remaining
shareholders. When a mutual fund sells securities to generate cash to pay
redeeming shareholders, such sales can create taxable gains for nonredeeming shareholders. In contrast, when an ETF makes an in-kind
distribution, only the redeeming shareholder recognizes taxable gains or
losses, although the taxable gain on any ETF-level BIG in the distributed
securities is eliminated.
This change should not be the death knell of ETFs because the ETF
manager still retains the option to choose the securities to be distributed.206
This is not unlike the decision a mutual fund manager must make when
deciding what securities to sell to fund redemption requests. For instance,
when the market is rising, the manager could follow a last in, first out
(LIFO) scheme and distribute high-basis securities to redeeming APs and
thereby minimize fund-level gains caused by redemptions. If, however, an
ETF¶s securities were increasing in value, this could cause the ETF¶s

204.
205.
206.

See supra Part II.E.
See supra Part II.C.3.
See supra Part II.C.3.
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overhang to increase,207 but again, this is the same choice a mutual fund
manager must make. If the market was falling, the manager could
distribute low-basis securities to redeeming shareholders to maximize an
ETF¶s BIL.208
The tremendous growth of ETFs demonstrates that they are a major
financial innovation, but this growth has certainly been stimulated by the
favorable tax treatment of in-kind distributions. Tax has also played a
major impetus in the creation of many other important financial products,
such as zero-coupon bonds and trust preferred structures. When the tax
subsidy was eliminated, the demand for products that are socially valuable,
such as zero-coupon bonds and Eurobonds, has remained and even
grown.209 Since ETFs offer low management fees, exposure to a broad
variety of indices, and instant liquidity at NAV or near NAV, there will be
continued demand for these benefits so long as the value of these benefits
exceeds the loss of the tax subsidy. Even if ETFs were to become tax
disadvantaged but still offer economic benefits that mutual funds do not,
ETFs may morph into investment vehicles that are best held by tax-exempt
entities, such as pensions, sovereign funds, IRAs, and 401(k) plans. There
is some indication that institutional investors are becoming a very
significant class of ETF shareholders.210 If, however, ETFs cannot survive
without the tax subsidy, then that is an indication that they may not be
socially beneficial.
C. Reducing the Basis of Fund Property by Unrecognized Gain
Another recently advocated approach211 is to maintain the current
non-recognition rule for distributions of appreciated property but to

207. For example, if a fund has three portfolios with bases of $100, $200, and $400
and each with a FV of $400, the BIG is $500. If the manager distributes the portfolio with
a basis of $400, the BIG is still $500, but it now represents 62.5 percent of the FV of the
fund¶s assets compared to 41.7 percent before redemption.
208. For example, if a fund has three portfolios with bases of $100, $200, and $400
and each with a FV of $100, the BIL is $400. If the manager distributes the portfolio with
a basis of $100, the BIL is still $400 for the remaining shareholders, but now it represents
200 percent of the FV of the fund¶s assets compared to 133 percent before.
209. $FFRUGLQJ WR RQH SURPLQHQW ILQDQFLDO HFRQRPLVW ³>W@KH PDMRU LPSXOses to
successful financial innovations over the past twenty years have come, I am saddened to
have to say, from the regulations and taxes.´ Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: The
Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 460 (1986).
He also describes how uneconomic tax rules created a demand for zero-coupon bonds, but
noted that after the tax rules were changed, there was still demand for zero-coupon bonds
because they eliminated reinvestment risk. See id. at 463.
210. See McCollum, supra note 195, at 3 (stating that institutional investors hold
greater than 20 percent of their assets in ETFs).
211. See Hodaszy, supra note 25, at 600±01.
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require a distributing fund to reduce the basis of its remaining property by
any unrecognized gain of the distributed property. This approach
specifically draws on § 362(c), which applies to contributions to capital of
property and cash to a corporation when the contribution is not contributed
as a shareholder in its capacity as a shareholder.212 Under
§ 362(c), a corporation must generally take a zero basis in such property
and reduce the basis of any property acquired with the contributed cash.213
If there is cash remaining after one year, the corporation must reduce the
basis of its other property.214
Unlike current § 852(b)(6), where the unrealized gain in the
distributed property simply disappears forever at the fund level, the basis
reduction proposal ensures that unrecognized gain in distributed property
would be maintained at the fund level through the mechanism of the
reduced basis in the fund¶s remaining securities. Thus, the unrealized gain
does not disappear but instead is deferred at the fund level until the
remaining securities are sold.
This proposal, the author suggests, is superior to an outright repeal of
§ 852(b)(6) because it would not interfere with the AP redemption process
by potentially triggering current taxable gain when appreciated securities
are distributed and it preserves at the fund level any unrecognized gain on
the distributed securities.215 Although the basis reduction proposal would
certainly accomplish these goals, it should be rejected because it is
inconsistent with sound tax policy principles and does not eliminate either
the tax competitive advantages of ETFs or the current deficiencies of
Subchapter M that fail to match taxable fund gains and shareholder level
gains.
Although the basis reduction proposal preserves fund-level gain,
there does not seem to be a justifiable tax policy reason to defer the gains
when the appreciated assets leave corporate solution. The author offers as
a policy justification for § 852(b)(6) the possibility of asset depletion in
the case of ³extreme market downturn.´216 As discussed above, this
concern may be highly exaggerated.217
Furthermore, the author does not proffer a sound policy reason to
treat for tax purposes the distribution of appreciated assets differently than
212. See id. at 600±02.
213. See 26 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2012) (amended 2014).
214. See id. § 362(c)(2) (amended 2014). The Treasury Regulations detail how the
basis reductions are made to various categories of property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.362-2(b)
(1960). Within each category of property, the reduction is done based on the adjusted basis
of each property. Id.
215. See Hodaszy, supra note 25, at 605.
216. See id. at 575, 594.
217. See supra Part III.B.
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the sale of appreciated assets followed by the distribution of cash. He
claims that requiring gain to be recognized on the distribution of
appreciated property would make it impossible for ETFs to continue.218
Although elimination of § 852(b)(6) would certainly lessen the tax
efficiency of ETFs, it is not certain that it would kill ETFs.
As discussed above, ETFs could mitigate any gain recognition caused
by the distribution of appreciated property by distributing high basis
property.219 Even if ETFs became less tax efficient than similar mutual
funds, the tax detriment could be outweighed by the ability to trade at
intra-day prices and gain economic exposure to a variety of asset classes.
Finally, if § 852(b)(6) were repealed, the natural tax clienteles would be
tax-exempt entities, such as pension funds and IRAs, which certainly
administer sufficient assets to support the continuing viability of ETFs. If
ETFs are only viable because of the tax subsidy of § 852(b)(6), they should
not survive.220
The proposal appears to ignore basis adjustments that exceed the
adjusted basis of a corporation¶s property. Following the approach of the
regulations under § 362, the basis reduction proposal reduces basis in
proportion to the basis of the assets, but not in excess of zero.221 In an
example to illustrate the function of the proposal, there is insufficient basis
to absorb the basis reduction, and the excess basis is apparently
disregarded, which means that the gain is never recognized at the fund
level.222 Because the basis reduction proposal is designed to be a deferral
mechanism and not an exclusion mechanism, a fund should have to
recognize gain when the basis of the property is reduced below zero or
apply the excess basis reduction to the basis of any remaining property.223
As noted by the author, ETFs currently rarely sell assets, except in
the case of mergers or changes in the index the ETF is tracking.224
Although this may change if the AUM of actively managed ETFs grows,
for the foreseeable future the deferral of unrecognized gains by ETFs is
tantamount to forgiveness. Also, the proposal does not address the tax

218. See Hodaszy, supra note 25, at 587, 595.
219. See supra Part III.B.
220. At least one commentator has questioned whether ETFs aid in price discovery
other than between the price of ETF shares and the value of the underlying ETF portfolio.
See Sheppard, supra note 25, at 1240 (questioning whether ETFs play a role in price
discovery but concluding that they are a tax shelter).
221. See Treas. Reg. § 1.362-2(b) (1960).
222. See Hodaszy, supra note 25, at 604 n.296.
223. A shareholder must recognize gain when it receives a distribution that exceeds
the corporation¶s current and accumulated E&P and the adjusted basis of the stock. 26
U.S.C. § 301(c)(3) (2012).
224. See Hodaszy, supra note 25, at 603.
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consequences of complete liquidations: if deferred gain is not required to
be recognized when an ETF liquidates, the manager could simply liquidate
the fund and the fund-level gains would be entirely forgiven.
This proposal not only permits the inappropriate deferral of
unrecognized gains when appreciated assets are distributed, it also
exacerbates the problem of matching the taxable gains of a RIC to the
shareholders who have economically benefited from those gains. Because
ETFs currently rarely sell assets, the deferred gains could accumulate for
years, and when they are eventually realized, it is unlikely that they would
be allocated to the shareholders that economically earned them.225
Finally, this proposal may affect the trading of ETF shares because
of the existence of the deferred tax liability. As the deferred gains in an
ETF grow, retail investors may begin to discount the value of the ETF
shares to reflect the possibility that the deferred taxes may be realized. To
illustrate, assume that the NAV of an ETF is $20, but due solely to basis
reductions, there is $10 of BIG per share. If retail shareholders believe that
the $10 of BIG will be realized, they will discount the price of the shares,
say to $18, which is $2 less than NAV.
Normally, in this case, APs could purchase shares at $18, redeem
them with the ETF, and get back securities worth $20, and thereby make
a riskless profit of $2. If, however, an AP wished to create and sell shares,
it would have to contribute securities worth $20, but it could only sell them
to retail shareholders for $18. To the extent that the purchases by the APs
did not drive the price to $20, there would be purchases and redemptions
of ETF shares but no creation of new shares. This scenario may be
unlikely, however, as it would create an opportunity for tax-exempt
investors because they could purchase and hold the shares without
incurring any tax liability.
D. Carryover Basis Regime
Another approach that draws on other pass-through regimes such as
partnerships and trusts is to require the recipient shareholder to take a
carryover basis in the securities received.226 A significant drawback to
such an approach is that it would require some mechanism to prevent
double taxation of the same gain. For instance, if a shareholder redeemed
and recognized gain on the redemption and received shares with BIG, in a
carryover regime, the sale of the appreciated property would also generate
taxable gain and thereby turn Subchapter M into a double tax regime.

225.
226.

See id.
See infra Part III.E.7.
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Special rules would also be needed to prevent the doubling of losses when
depreciated property was distributed.227
A solution to prevent double taxation would be to treat in-kind
redemptions as non-taxable, which is how distributions by partnerships to
partners are treated.228 This result is possible because partnership taxation
treats partnership interests as having a unitary basis, requires a partner to
reduce its basis in its partnership interest when the partnership distributes
property, and generally endeavors to match inside and outside basis.229
Mixing elements from the separate-entity treatment of Subchapter M,
where there is no attempt to match inside and outside basis, and the
aggregate treatment that generally applies in Subchapter K is unwise.
Instead, serious consideration should be given to requiring ETFs to be
subject to Subchapter K.
E. Partnership Tax Model for ETFs
Rather than repeal § 852(b)(6), Congress could prohibit ETFs and
perhaps all RICs that offer creation-type shares from being subject to
Subchapter M and instead require them to be subject to certain partnership
tax rules. Basic principles of Subchapter K applied to ETFs could
eliminate many of the current deficiencies of Subchapter M, albeit with a
concomitant, very significant increase in administrative complexity.
Other commentators who have explored the infirmities of Subchapter
M have suggested that the partnership tax model may be superior to
Subchapter M,230 but have generally dismissed applying partnership tax
rules to investment companies. One commentator, while noting the
benefits of Subchapter K, argued that the additional complexity of
Subchapter K would outweigh the benefits of matching taxable and
economic income.231 None of these commentators, however, focused on
the emerging tax policy challenges raised by ETFs.
227. Under prior law, when property was distributed to a corporation as an ordinary
distribution under § 301, it would take a basis equal to the lesser of its FMV or its adjusted
basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(h)(2)(ii) (1960). This rule ensured that any BIG would be
taxed to the corporate recipient, but that losses would not. Even though the regulation has
not been withdrawn, it is overruled by § 301(d), which requires that all shareholders take a
FMV basis of property distributed as a dividend. See 26 U.S.C. § 301(d).
228. Id. § 731(a)(1)±(2) (stating that no gain or loss is recognized by a partner
receiving only capital gain property from a partnership).
229. See infra Parts III.E.4, III.E.7.
230. See Fisher, supra note 121, at 388 (³[I]t is the confluence of the Code and 1940
Act that prevents the use of the most logical alternative structure to RICs, the
partnership.´).
231. See Coates, supra note 25, at 614. The same commentator also stated, without
much evidence, that ³the complexity and costs associated with simply extending these
[partnership tax] options to mutual funds would likely be cost-prohibitive in the standard,
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The concerns about administrative complexity may be overblown,
especially given that the complexity, at the fund level, is mostly one of
computational record-keeping capacity, which current hardware and
software may be capable of handling. At the owner-level, the reporting
would be slightly different²investors would receive Form K-1 instead of
Form 1099. Although the information supplied would be largely the same,
Form K-1 can be more complicated for the average investor than Form
1099. In addition, since ETFs and mutual funds generally share economic
gains and losses in proportion to their capital interests, some of the
administrative complexity that is associated with special allocations by
some partnerships disappears. Hedge funds232 that invest primarily in
securities generally follow some, but not all, of the rules discussed below,
and publicly traded partnerships and ETFs that are taxed as partnerships
follow many of the rules discussed below, although with some simplifying
modifications to accommodate the administrative strains that arise when
there is a significant turnover of ownership interests.233
1. The Current Prohibition of the Partnership Option for ETFs
Publicly offered investment companies are currently not eligible to
elect partnership tax treatment. Under § 7704, a publicly traded
partnership is generally treated as a corporation for tax purposes.234 If,
however, 90 percent or more of a partnership¶s gross income is ³qualifying
income,´ which includes interest, dividends, and gains from the sale of
capital assets, the partnership will not be treated as a corporation.235
Although most ETFs and mutual funds would satisfy the qualifying
income exception, this exception is not available if the partnership would

widely held mutual funds through which middle class investors typically invest.´ Id. at 606
n.23.
232. Generally, only accredited investors can invest in hedge funds. Thus, any
complications arising from receiving a Form K-1 are handled by their tax preparers and
not the investors.
233. See, e.g., Direxion Shares ETF Tr. II, Registration Statement (Form S-1) 46±58
(Dec. 14, 2016) (describing the tax status of funds as partnerships and the consequences to
U.S. shareholders).
234. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(a) (2012). Interests are publicly traded if they are either traded
on an established market or on a secondary market or its substantial equivalent. Id.
§ 7704(b). ETF interests are clearly publicly traded, and even though mutual fund shares
are not traded on an exchange, they would be publicly traded because the fund stands ready
to redeem the shares at NAV. Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-1(c)(2)(iii) (1995). There are certain
exemptions, for example, for private placements and certain redemptions, but they are
inapplicable to publicly traded ETFs and mutual funds.
235. See 26 U.S.C. § 7704(c)(2), (d)(1)(A)±(B), (D). Qualifying income also includes
income listed under § 851(b)(2)(A), such as gains from the sale of foreign currencies,
options, forwards, and futures on securities. Id. § 7704(d)(4).
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be a RIC if it were a U.S. corporation.236 Because a publicly offered ETF
or a mutual fund that invests primarily in securities would be a
management company if it were a U.S. corporation, such entities cannot
elect to be taxed as partnerships and get pass-through tax treatment only
through the route of Subchapter M.
A partnership whose principal activity is buying and selling noninventory commodities or forwards, futures, or options with respect to
commodities can elect partnership taxation even if it would otherwise be
a RIC.237 Although the statute appears to require enabling regulations,
some market participants have taken the position that it is self-enabling.238
In addition, there is a significant number of publicly traded partnerships,
referred to as Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs), which are actively
engaged primarily in the oil and gas business.239 Since they are not
investment companies under the 1940 Act, they can be taxed as
partnerships.
The existence of a significant number of MLPs, including ETFs,
demonstrates that partnership taxation and publicly traded ownership
interests can coexist. In addition, hedge funds are generally organized as
partnerships for tax purposes and have thrived, although they are generally
available only to accredited investors. Hedge funds, because they
generally buy and sell securities, are more like ETFs than many MLPs,
which are often operating companies.
2. Subchapter K
Subchapter K has a panoply of provisions that are designed to
allocate the taxable gains and losses of a partnership to those partners who
have economically benefited or suffered from the gains or losses. These
provisions reflect an aggregate view of partnership taxation in which each
partner is treated as owning an undivided interest in the partnership¶s
assets. Some corollaries of the aggregate approach that incorporate
fundamental tax principles are that a partner should not be able to use a
236. Id. § 7704(c)(3).
237. Id. Currently 35 out of 1,983 ETFs are commodity ETFs taxed as partnerships.
See ETF Screener, ETF DATABASE, etfdb.com/screener/#assetClass=Commodity&taxform=K-1 (last visited Aug. 4, 2017).
238. See, e.g., Pebble U.S. Mkt. Fund, L.L.C., Amendment No. 6 To Form S-1
Registration Statement (Form S-1) 22 (May 28, 2010) (stating that ³the lack of regulations
should not alter the Fund¶s classification as a partnership for tax purposes´).
239. Under § 7704(d)(1)(E), qualifying income includes income from the ³exploration,
development, mining or production´ of any natural resource. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E). A
list of MLPs can be found at List of Current MLPs and MLP Funds, MASTER LTD. P¶SHIP
ASS¶N, https://www.mlpassociation.org/mlp-101/list-of-current-mlps/ (last visited Aug. 4,
2017).
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partnership to transfer to other partners BIG and BIL that arose before the
property was contributed to the partnership, and a partnership should not
be able to transfer to new partners BIG and BIL that arose before a new
partner joined the partnership. Furthermore, distributions and
contributions of property to and from a partnership are generally tax free,
but any gain or loss is preserved in either the property received or the
remaining partnership interest.
These rules would mitigate many of the current weaknesses of
Subchapter M, including the elimination of BIG on the distribution of
appreciated property, the temporary allocation of taxable gains to new
shareholders, and the temporary double benefit from taxable losses. This
solution, however, is certainly not a costless panacea. Certain rules
discussed below were not specifically designed to accommodate
partnerships with many partners, frequent changes of ownership (such as
MLPs in which ownership changes can occur multiple times per day), and
a significant number of assets. Consequently, certain modifications to
these rules are necessary to make them administrable; even then, they can
only be implemented with sophisticated software.
One possibly significant consequence of requiring ETFs to be treated
as partnerships for tax purposes is the potential application of the unrelated
business taxable income (UBTI) provisions.240 Entities such as pension
plans, universities, 401(k) plans, and IRAs are generally exempt from
tax,241 but they are subject to tax at corporate rates on their UBTI. 242
Income from RICs does not constitute UBTI.
Passive investment income such as dividends, interest, income from
notional principal contracts, options, and capital gains does not generate
UBTI,243 whether the tax-exempt entity receives the income directly or
indirectly through a partnership.244 Consequently, the investment income
of an ETF treated as a partnership that is allocated to a tax-exempt investor
should not generate UBTI.
If, however, an ETF treated as a partnership borrows to make a debtfinanced investment, the income or gain from the investment is UBTI. 245
Property is debt-financed property if there is acquisition indebtedness
during the taxable year.246 Acquisition indebtedness refers to indebtedness

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

The author thanks Barnet Phillips IV for bringing this issue to his attention.
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012).
See id. §§ 511(a)(1), 512±13.
See id. §§ 512(b)(1), (b)(5).
See id. § 512(c).
Id. §§ 512(c), 514(a).
Id. § 514(b)(1).
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incurred to acquire the property.247 To the extent an ETF treated as a
partnership generates UBTI, this could dissuade institutional investors
from investing in ETFs.
The following discussion describes these provisions, how they
remedy the issues discussed above, including the separation of economic
and taxable income and the elimination of BIG on the distribution of
appreciated property, and highlights certain aspects that raise
administrative concerns. The following sections also describe how
publicly traded partnerships (PTPs) apply these rules. Even though some
of the rules discussed below are currently being revised, the changes
should not significantly affect their application to investment companies.
3. Section 704(c) and Reverse § 704(c) Allocations
Partnership taxable gains can arise from the sale of property that has
been contributed to the partnership with BIG248 or from the sale of property
that has increased in value after contribution or purchase.
Taxable gain recognized upon the sale of partnership property that is
attributable to BIG when the property was contributed to the partnership
must generally be allocated to the partner who contributed the property.249
Economic gains and losses as reflected in the partners¶ capital accounts
arising after property has been contributed to or purchased by a partnership
are generally ignored. If, however, there is a change in the ownership of
the partnership interests, for instance, in connection with the contribution
of money or property by a new or existing partner, or the partnership
distributes cash or other property to a partner in consideration for a

247. Id. § 514(c)(1)(A). It also includes indebtedness incurred before or after the
property was acquired ³if such indebtedness would not have been incurred but for the
acquisition´ of the property. Id. §§ 514(c)(1)(B)±(C). The IRS has issued private letter
rulings that hold that short-term borrowings to facilitate redemptions and not making
additional investments did not constitute acquisition indebtedness. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2003-20-027 (Feb. 20, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-35-042 (May 21, 2002).
248. Property can generally be contributed tax-free to a partnership. See 26 U.S.C. §
721(a) (2012). If no gain or loss is recognized upon contribution of property, the
contributing partner will take a carryover basis in her partnership interest. See id. § 722.
249. See id. § 704(c)(1)(A). This allocation is done by maintaining separate tax and
book capital accounts and by requiring the allocation of any realized taxable gain first to
the partner who contributed the property to the extent of the BIG when the property was
contributed. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(1) (2017). If the amount of taxable gain is less than
the partner¶s book-tax difference attributed to the contributed property, the partnership may
be able to make allocations to correct the difference. See id. § 1.704-3(c)±(d) (describing
the use of the traditional method with curative allocations and the remedial method). The
contributing partner is also allocated gain if the property is distributed to another partner
within 7 years of being contributed. See 26 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1)(B); infra Parts III.E.6±7.
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partnership interest, the partnership may adjust the capital accounts.250 The
partners¶ capital accounts can also be adjusted to reflect changes in the
value of partnership assets if ³substantially all of the partnership¶s
property . . . consists of stock, securities, . . . options, [or] futures . . . that
are readily tradable on an established securities market.´251
In these cases, there is a so-called ³book-up´ whereby the partnership
marks to market its assets for book purposes and allocates book gains and
losses to the partners.252 In a hedge fund, for example, this can occur daily,
weekly, or at least every break period, which is when partner entries and
exits are permitted.253 To ensure that tax gains or losses are properly
allocated to the partner that has economically earned or borne them, a
partnership must allocate the book gains and losses among the partners
following the same approach for § 704(c) gains and losses.254 These gains
and losses are referred to as reverse § 704(c) allocations.255 When the
property is sold, the tax gains and losses will be allocated to the partners
to whom the book gains and losses were allocated.
Although § 704(c) applies on a property-by-property basis,256
securities partnerships can elect to aggregate gains and losses and apply §
704(c) on an aggregate basis.257 The § 704(c) regulations specifically
250. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(i)±(ii) (2017).
251. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(v).
252. These adjustments are not mandatory, but the regulations caution that if the
partnership does not make these adjustments in the case of an acquisition or relinquishment
of a partnership interest, the partnership must still generally allocate taxable gain and loss
under § 704(c) principles. See id.; see also id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 14(iv) (discussing the
consequences of not booking up upon the entrance of a new partner and allocating equally
all taxable gain attributable to the sale of a partnership asset). For a discussion of this issue,
see Howard E. Abrams, Reverse Allocations: More Than Meets the Eye, 5 J. PASSTHROUGH
ENTITIES. 35, 41 (2002).
253. $FFRUGLQJ WR RQH FRPPHQWDWRU UHYDOXDWLRQV DUH D ³IDFW RI OLIH UDWKHU WKDQ DQ
isolated event, for an investment partnership.´ Stephen B. Land, Revaluations Revisited:
Partnership Allocations and the Demise of the Ceiling Rule, 54 TAX. LAW. 241, 245 (2001).
254. See 26 U.S.C. § 704(c).
255. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(6) (2017).
256. Id. § 1.704-3(a)(2).
257. A securities partnership includes an investmeQW SDUWQHUVKLS LI ³WKH SDUWQHUVKLS
makes all book allocations in proportion to the partners¶ relative book capital accounts.´
Id. § 1.704-3(e)(3)(iii)(A). This definition was expanded in Rev. Proc. 2007-59, 2007-40
I.R.B. 745 (2007). Most ETFs, but not all, would satisfy the definition of a securities
partnership. One commentator stated that ³[a]lthough many (perhaps most) hedge funds do
not qualify as securities partnerships, almost all of them allocate reverse § 704(c) gains and
losses on an aggregate basis.´ Andrew W. Needham, Portfolio 736-2nd: Hedge Funds, 736
Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) § V.C.3. The New York State Bar Association has argued for
expanding the class of partnerships eligible to use aggregation because separate allocation
can be ³unduly burdensome´ for partnerships with many assets. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar
Ass¶n Tax Section, Report on Aggregation Issues Facing Securities Partnership Under
Subchapter K, 17 (2010) [hereinafter NYSBA]. But see Letter from Terrence Floyd Cuff,
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approve two methods of aggregation: partial netting and full netting.258 In
partial netting, tax gains and losses are separately aggregated and then the
aggregate tax gains and aggregate tax losses are allocated among the
partners to reduce book-tax disparities of the partners as reflected in each
partner¶s revaluation account.259 In full netting, tax gains and losses are
netted, and net tax gain or net tax loss is allocated among the partners to
reduce book-tax disparities of the partners as reflected in each partner¶s
revaluation account.260
Example 4
A and B each contribute $100 to AB partnership, which purchases
security 1 and security 2 for $100 each. Later when security 1 depreciates
to $50 and security 2 appreciates to $350, C contributes $200 for a 1/3
interest in ABC partnership. The entry of C will cause a reverse § 704(c)
allocation of $100 to each of the capital accounts of A and B, while their
tax capital accounts and outside basis each remains at $100, whereas C
will have a book and tax capital account of $200. If, for example, both
securities were immediately sold for their FMV, the net $200 of tax gain
would be allocated only to A and B, with the result that their book and
tax capital accounts would then be equal.

The following table shows the partnership accounts immediately
after C¶s contribution.
Assets
Cash
Security 1
Security 2

Tax
200
100
100
400

Book
200
50
350
600

A
B
C

Capital Accounts
Tax
Book
100
200
100
200
200
200
400
600

Reverse § 704(c) allocations are intended to ensure that the tax gains
or losses associated with the economic gains or losses that arose before
Partner, Loeb & Loeb LLP, to Michael Mundaca, Assistant Sec¶y (Tax Policy), Dep¶t of
the Treasury (Mar. 30, 2011) (available on Lexis, 2011 TNT 66-24) (arguing that
aggregation should be eliminated for securities partnerships and suggesting that the
administrative burden of complying with property-by-property accounting may not be
overwhelming given modern computer software).
258. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3)(iv)± Y  (DFK SDUWQHU¶V ERRN-tax differences are
reflected in the partner¶s revaluation account, which is merely the difference between a
partner¶s capital account and tax capital account.
259. Id. § 1.704-3(e)(3)(iv). Aggregate tax gains are allocated to partners with positive
revaluation accounts, and aggregate tax losses are allocated to partners with negative
revaluation accounts.
260. Id. § 1.704-3(e)(3)(v). For an illustration of the different tax consequences
associated with partial and full netting, see id. § 1.704-3(e)(3)(ix) exs. 1±2. Most hedge
funds apparently follow full netting. See Needham, supra note 257, § V.B.
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certain changes in a partnership, e.g., a new partner entering the
partnership, will be allocated to the partners that benefited from economic
gains or bore economic losses. Thus, in Example 4, A¶s and B¶s net
economic gains are $100 each when C enters the partnership, and their
capital accounts are adjusted by these amounts. When the tax gains
associated with these book adjustments are realized, they must be allocated
to A and B. In this example, after the entrance of C and a sale of both
securities for their book value, inside basis and outside basis will both
equal $600.261
Requiring ETFs and mutual funds to make reverse § 704(c)
adjustments may better align taxable and economic gains and losses and
thereby prevent the allocation of taxable gains to new shareholders.
Although in this example the adjustments are straightforward, for an ETF
or mutual fund, the adjustments would be more complex primarily because
of the number of ownership changes. Publicly traded commodity
investment partnerships with ETF features typically mitigate the
administrative burdens of reverse § 704(c) allocations by requiring
revaluations only monthly.262 Because mutual funds and ETFs maintain
their books on a daily fair value basis,263 however, many of the
complications that arise in making reverse § 704(c) allocations for
companies that operate businesses, for example, allocating depreciation
deductions and valuing assets, disappear.
Similar to reverse § 704(c) allocations, publicly traded partnerships
also generally allocate taxable income on a monthly basis.264 When a
261. After a sale of securities 1 and 2, the total taxable gain of $200 would be allocated
to A and B, and their adjusted bases in the partnership would increase to $200 each. See 26
U.S.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (2012). The resulting taxable gain or loss is required to be allocated
to reduce the book-tax disparity of the partners. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-3(e)(3)(iv)(C),
1.704-3(e)(3)(v)(C). In this example, whether the partnership applied reverse § 704(c)
allocations on an asset-by-asset or aggregate basis, the total taxable gain is allocated to A
and B. If a partnership elects aggregation, it is possible for a partner to be allocated taxable
gain that arose before the partner entered the partnership if the partner has a book-tax
disparity. This result occurs because aggregation treats all gains equally. That is, the
identity of the particular asset is irrelevant. For an illustration, see Needham, supra note
257, § V.C.
262. See, e.g., ProShares Tr. II, Common Units of Beneficial Interest (424BN3) 75±76
(Mar. 28, 2017) (describing monthly revaluations convention). The revaluations are done
not based on the FMV of the assets at the time of the revaluations, as required by
regulations, but instead based on the creation or redemption price of shares during the
month. Id. at 75. This approach, while viable for ETFs, would not be viable for mutual
funds because mutual funds must stand ready to make daily redemptions at NAV.
263. See supra Part II.C.1.
264. See, e.g., ProShares Tr. II, supra note 262, at 79. The taxable income and losses
are allocated by the number of shares owned as of the close of the last trading day of the
preceding month. Thus, a shareholder who sells his shares during the month could be
allocated taxable income or loss that arose after the shareholder sold his shares. Id.
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partner¶s ownership interest changes in the case of a sale or partial
liquidation, the partnership must adjust the partner¶s share of its tax items
to take into account the partner¶s varying interest in the partnership. The
partnership can either close its books on an interim basis or prorate on a
daily basis the year-end tax items.265 Regardless of whether a PTP chooses
to use either the proration or interim closing-the-books method, a PTP may
treat transfers of PTP interests as occurring on the first day of the following
month.266 This means that a partner that sells its interest on the first of the
month can be allocated an additional month of tax items.
4. Distributions of Cash and § 734
Although reverse § 704(c) allocations help to match taxable gains and
losses with economic gains and losses, certain transactions, such as the
distribution of cash or property, can cause a divergence between inside
basis and outside basis and possibly shift taxable gains or losses to partners
who have not benefited from or borne them. To illustrate, assume that
immediately after C enters the partnership, $200 is distributed to partner
A in liquidation of his interest. A will recognize $100 of gain (amount
realized of $200 less basis of $100).267 Immediately after the distribution,
WKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VWD[DQGFDSLWDODFFRXQWVZLOOEH
Assets
Security 1
Security 2

Tax
100
100
200

Book
50
350
400

B
C

Capital Accounts
Tax
Book
100
200
200
200
300
400

Since the distribution of property generally does not affect the
SDUWQHUVKLS¶VEDVLVLQLWVSURSHUW\DIWHUWKHGLVWULEXWLRQ268 WKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶V
inside basis is $200, but the remainLQJSDUWQHUV¶WRWDORXWVLGHEDVLVLVQRZ

Partnership income is generally required to be allocated between transferors and transferees
or among partners if their interest changes on a daily basis, although a semimonthly
convention may be used. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.706-4(c)(1)±(2) (2015).
265. Id. § 1.706-4(a). The default rule is the interim closing method. Id. Extraordinary
items, such as capital gains, must be allocated among the partners on the day that they are
taken into account and thus may not be prorated. Id. § 1.706-4(e). A partnership must
generally use the calendar day convention for either the interim closing of the books or
proration option, but may adopt either a semimonthly or monthly convention if it uses the
interim closing method. Id. § 1.706-4(c)(3)(i). A PTP may use any convention with respect
to either variation during the taxable year. Id. § 1.706-4(c)(3)(ii).
266. Id. § 1.706-4(c)(2)(iii).
267. See 26 U.S.C. § 731(a)(1) (2012).
268. See id. § 734(a) (stating that the ³basis of partnership property shall not be
adjusted´ for distribution of property to a partner unless the partnership has a § 754 election
in effect).
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$300. If the securities were immediately sold for $400, there would be
$250 of taxable gain and $50 of taxable loss. B would be allocated the first
$100 of taxable gain to eliminate B¶V ERRN-tax difference, and the
remaining $150 would be split between B and C, as would the $50 of loss.
Each of B¶VDQG C¶VRXWVLGHEDVLVZRXOGWKHQLQFUHDVHWREXWWKH
total value inside the partnership would only be $400.
Although A¶s share of inside basis was $100, when A¶s interest was
liquidated, A removed $200 of basis from the partnership. Because A
removed more than its share of inside basis, A left too little basis and too
much gain in the partnership for the remaining partners. Consequently, B
and C will be temporarily overtaxed by $100 if the securities are sold for
their book value, which will not be rectified until they either sell their
interests or the partnership is liquidated.
Given that a mutual fund generally distributes cash in redemption of
a shareholder¶s interest at NAV, if a mutual fund were taxed as a
partnership, these differences between inside and outside basis would
continually arise as they do currently under Subchapter M, and the case
for switching from Subchapter M to Subchapter K may not be as strong.
A partnership, however, can elect under § 754 to apply special rules that
are intended eliminate the inside-outside basis divide that can arise in
distributions of cash and property and sales of partnership interests.269
In the previous example, the distribution to A of $200 caused A to
recognize $100 of gain but also created a $100 difference between the
inside basis of the partnership and the total outside basis of the partners.
This occurred because A removed $200, which is $100 more than his share
of inside basis. If the partnership makes a § 754 election, it is required
under § 734 to adjust the tax basis of partnership property when a partner
recognizes gain by receiving cash greater than its basis in the
partnership.270
When A recognizes gain upon receiving cash in excess of its basis in
its partnership interest, the partnership must increase the basis of its
property by the gain recognized.271 The basis adjustment prevents the same
gain that A recognized from being taxed again to the remaining partners
when the partnership sells its property.272 Returning to Example 4, the
269. See id. § 754.
270. Whether or not a partnership has § 754 election in effect, a partnership is required
to reduce the basis of its property if a partner either recognizes a loss of greater than
$250,000 upon liquidation of its partnership interest or increases the basis of property
received in liquidation by more than $250,000. Id. § 734(d)(1).
271. Id. § 734(b)(1).
272. Regulations under § 755 require in this case the adjustment to be made solely to
capital gain property and then to property with BIG in proportion to BIG (but only to the
extent of BIG) with any excess allocated among the properties in proportion to their FMV.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.755-1(c)(1)(ii), 1.755-1(c)(2)(i) (2017).
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partnership would increase the basis of security 2 from $100 to $200 and
thereby eliminate the $100 of gain that A recognized when it received cash
in excess of its basis. After the basis adjustment, there would be $100 of
net BIG in the partnership¶s assets, which exactly equals the difference
between outside and inside basis.273
Assets
Security 1
Security 2

Tax
100
200
300

Book
50
350
400

B
C

Capital Accounts
Tax
Book
100
200
200
200
300
400

These examples show how reverse § 704(c) allocations ensure that
the taxable gains and losses associated with economic gains and losses that
arise before a new partner joins the partnership or changes his or her
partnership interest are taxed to the partners who have benefited from the
economic gains or borne the economic losses. Section 734 adjustments
ensure that taxable gains and losses realized upon the distribution of cash
to a partner are not temporarily taxed again or provide a temporary benefit
to other partners.
Book-ups, book-downs, and § 734 adjustments ameliorate many of
the uneconomic tax results that can arise with mutual funds, because
mutual fund shareholders generally acquire their interests solely for cash
and receive cash when redeeming from a fund. It is certain, however, that
§ 734 would significantly increase the administrative burden for an ETF.
In fact, most securities partnerships do not make a § 754 election because
of the increased accounting burdens even though there could be tax
benefits for the partners, although PTPs always make a § 754 election to
ensure that the PTPs¶ interests are fungible.274 To ameliorate these

273. If both securities were immediately sold after the § 734 adjustment, there would
be $150 of gain and $50 of loss. If the partnership elected partial netting, partner B would
be allocated $125 of gain ($100 to eliminate the revaluation account and one half of the
remaining $50), and $25 of loss. C would be allocated $25 of gain and $25 of loss. If the
partnership elected full netting, the net $100 of gain would be allocated solely to B. In this
example, partial and full netting yield the same results. Similarly, if A had recognized loss
upon the liquidation of its partnership interest and the partnership had a § 754 election in
effect, the partnership would reduce the basis of partnership property to prevent the same
loss recognized by the departing partner from being used temporarily by the remaining
partners. When loss is recognized, the departing partner removes less than its share of
inside basis and therefore leaves too little gain or too much loss inside the partnership. See
26 U.S.C. § 734(b)(2)(A). The decrease in basis is made solely to capital gain property and
then to property with BIL in proportion to BIL (but only to the extent of each property¶s
BIL) with any excess allocated among the properties in proportion to their adjusted bases.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.755-1(c)(1)(ii), 1.755-1(c)(2)(ii).
274. NYSBA, supra note 257, at 27. For a discussion of the fungibility issue for PTPs,
see Deborah Fields et al., Triangles in a World of Squares: A Primer on Significant U.S.
Federal Income Tax Issues for Natural Resources Publicly Traded Partnerships (Part IV—
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burdens, some commentators have suggested that a securities partnership
should be able to treat the § 734 adjustments as a separate asset and then
recovered over some period by adjusting the partnership¶s income.275
These same tax issues, however, would still exist for closed-end
funds and ETFs because their non-AP owners dispose of or acquire their
interests on an exchange and not from the fund. Section 743 addresses
adjustments to partnership property when partnership interests are
purchased or sold.276
5. Sales and Acquisitions of Partnership Interests and § 734
In the absence of a § 754 election, a partnership does not adjust the
basis of its property for gain or loss recognized when a partner sells a
partnership interest.277 In addition, the purchasing partner inherits the
selling partner¶s tax and book capital accounts, and these accounts are not
adjusted to reflect BIG or BIL in the partnership¶s assets, unlike the case
of a contribution or distribution of cash or property.278
If the basis of partnership property is not adjusted to reflect gain or loss
recognized by a selling partner, a purchasing partner can be taxed on gains
or benefit from losses that arose prior to the purchase of his interest.279
Returning to the facts of Example 4, assume that A instead sells its
partnership interest to D for $200 and recognizes $100 of gain.280
Immediately after the sale, the total outside basis is $500 but the total
inside basis is still $400, since the inside basis was not changed to reflect
the $100 of gain.
D pays FMV, which reflects any unrealized gains and losses, for its
partnership interest, but since the basis of the partnership property is not
Secondary Offerings and the Impact of Public Trading), TAXES, Oct. 2010, at 32±36
(describing how the § 754 election helps to ensure that publicly traded units are fungible).
275. Id. at 29±34.
276. 26 U.S.C. § 743(a) (2012).
277. Id. A basis adjustment is mandatory if the partnership has a substantial built-in
loss, i.e., the basis of its property is greater than its FMV by more than $250,000. Id. §§
743(a), 743(d).
278. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) (2017) (stating that capital accounts are not
adjusted for sales of partnership interests); id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(l) (stating that the
purchasing partner inherits the selling partner¶s capital account); id. § 1.704-3(a)(7)
(requiring that BIG and BIL are allocated to the transferee partner as they would have been
allocated to the transferor partner).
279. Since 2004, for property contributed to a partnership that has a BIL, only the
contributing partner can use the loss. 26 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) (2012); Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.704-3(f), 79 Fed. Reg. 3042 (Jan. 16, 2014). These rules do not apply to property for
which a BIL is created pursuant to a reverse § 704(c) revaluation. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-3(f)(2)(i).
280. Because property held by a securities partnership is generally capital gain
property, it is assumed that the gain would be capital. See 26 U.S.C. § 741(a) (2012).
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adjusted, D will be taxed again on the unrealized gains and benefit from
unrealized losses when they are realized. Thus, if securities 1 and 2 are
sold for their book values, D and B will each be allocated $100 of taxable
gain, which increases B¶s and D¶s outside basis in the partnership to $300
and $200, respectively. After the sales, the total outside basis will be $700,
but the inside basis of the partnership assets will only be $600.
Consequently, D will be temporarily overtaxed by $100, which will not be
corrected until either D sells his partnership interest or the partnership is
liquidated.
If, however, the partnership has a § 754 election in effect, the
partnership increases the basis of its property solely with respect to the
purchasing partner by the difference between D¶s basis in the partnership
interest ($200) and D¶s share of inside basis ($100).281 The partnership is
required to establish a separate account for each property by allocating the
total § 743 adjustment among each property of the partnership based on
each property¶s BIG or BIL.282
The § 743 adjustment aims to ensure that a purchasing partner is not
taxed on existing BIG or BIL when it is realized by the partnership by
treating the partner as if he purchased a proportionate share of each
partnership property. When the partnership sells property subject to a
§ 743 adjustment, the partnership computes gain or loss using the
partnership¶s common basis in the property, and the taxable gain or loss is
allocated among the partners pursuant to § 704(c). The taxable income or
loss allocated to the purchasing partner is then adjusted by the § 743
adjustment.
In Example 4, D will have a $125 § 743 adjustment for security 1 and
a negative $25 adjustment for security 2. If, for example, security 2 is sold
for $410, the partnership will recognize a book gain of $60, which is

281. Id. § 743(b)(1)±(2). If a partnership has a substantial built-in loss, the § 743(b)
adjustments are mandatory. Id. § 743(a), (d). The total § 743 adjustment is the difference
between the transferee partner¶s basis in his partnership interest and his share of the
adjusted basis of the partnership property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b)(1)±(2) (as amended
in 2004). For a partnership without liabilities, a partner¶s share of inside basis is merely the
partner¶s tax capital account, or the amount of cash the partner would receive if the
partnership were liquidated, increased by any tax losses, and decreased by any tax gain.
See id. § 1.743-1(d)(1). In the table above, D¶s tax capital account is $100, which is the
same as the amount D would receive if the partnership were liquidated ($200), plus D¶s
share of tax loss ($25), less D¶s share of tax gain ($125).
282. Even if the total § 743 adjustment is positive, some properties may have a
negative adjustment and others a positive adjustment. Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(b)(3)(ii) (as
amended in 2017) (describing the allocation of § 743 adjustment among capital gain
property). The adjustment does not affect capital accounts or the common basis of
partnership property. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(m)(2) (stating that § 743 adjustments are not
reflected in capital accounts); id. § 1.743-1(j)(1) (stating that § 743 does not affect common
basis of partnership property).
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shared equally among the partners, and a taxable gain of $310, of which
$145 is allocated to both D and A and $20 to B. Of the $145 gain allocated
to D, however, D will reduce its gain by the $125 § 743 adjustment so that
D includes in income only $20, which will also be D¶s basis adjustment in
its partnership interest.283

Cash
Security 1
Security 2

Asse ts
Tax
Book
200
200
100
50
100
350
400
600

D
B
C

Capital Accounts
Tax
Book
100
200
100
200
200
200
400
600
743 Adjustme nt for D
Security 1
-25
Security 2
125

Again, in this simple example, the § 743 adjustments are
straightforward because there is only one purchasing partner, D, and two
partnership assets for which an adjustment must be tracked. In a
partnership in which interests are frequently traded and which owns a
multitude of assets, the administrative complexity required to track § 743
adjustments increases immensely. Each time a partnership interest is
traded, a separate § 743 account for each asset must be newly created and
tracked for the purchasing partner,284 although for the selling partner the §
743 adjustment disappears when the interest is sold.285
Unlike reverse § 704(c) allocations, the § 743 regulations do not
permit aggregate approaches for § 743 adjustments, and the adjustments
must be made on an asset-by-asset basis. This increases significantly the
administrative burdens. It has been suggested that § 743(b) adjustments be
permitted to be done on an aggregate basis and then recovered based on
turnover or realization.286 If permitted, such an approach could
significantly reduce the administrative burdens associated with § 754
elections.
The tax disclosures of publicly traded partnerships do not explain
how § 743 adjustments are made other than to note that ³certain
283. Id. § 1.743-1(j)(3) (stating that a partner¶s gain or loss from the sale of a
partnership asset with a § 743 adjustment is the partner¶s share of the gain or loss minus
any positive adjustment or plus any negative adjustment).
284. The reporting requirements for both the partnership and transferee partner are set
out in Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(k).
285. Id. § 1.743-1(f).
286. NYSBA, supra note 257, at 38±40.
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conventions´ are applied to reduce administrative complexity and the
administrative costs of applying § 743 adjustments.287 An additional
administrative complexity required by § 743 is the need to obtain each
owner¶s cost basis in its interests so that the fund can apply the § 743
adjustment. This can be challenging as fund interests may not be held in
the name of the beneficial owner but instead in the name of the brokerage
where the shares are held. Each purchaser generally is deemed to consent
to obtaining this information from the record holder.288
The prior examples focused first on contributions of cash,
distributions of cash, and sales of partnership interests. The framework set
out above would, if applied to closed-end funds and mutual funds, improve
the deficiencies of Subchapter M that result in the temporary over-taxation
and under-taxation of shareholders caused by discrepancies between
inside and outside basis. Adopting these provisions, however, would
significantly increase administrative burdens. ETFs have the additional
complication of in-kind contributions and distributions, but these same
principles discussed above are also applicable to property contributions
and distributions.
6. Contributions of Property
Contributions to mutual funds are generally made in cash, but they
are generally made in kind to ETFs. Contributions of securities to ETFs
taxed as RICs are generally taxable because the transferring AP does not
have control of the ETF.289 In contrast, the contribution of a diversified
portfolio of securities to an investment partnership would likely be taxfree to the contributing partner, the partnership would take a carryover
basis in the transferred securities, and the partner would take a carryover
basis in the partnership interest.290

287. See, e.g., ProShares Tr. II, Prospectus (424B3) 76 (Mar. 28, 2017) (describing
§ 743(b) adjustments); Direxion Shares ETF Tr. II, Prospectus (Form S-1) (Dec. 14, 2016).
288. Direxion Shares ETF Tr. II, supra note 287, 51.
289. The exchanges probably do not qualify for tax-free treatment under § 351(a)
because the AP that transfers securities is not in control of the ETF immediately after the
transfer. See 26 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2012). Control requires ownership of 80 percent of the
voting stock of the transferee corporation. Id. § 368(c).
290. Id. § 721(a) (stating that the transfer of property to a partnership is tax-free to the
transferring partner); id. § 723 (stating that the partner takes a carryover basis in the
partnership interest); id. § 733 (stating that the partnership takes a carryover basis in
transferred property). Although transfers to a partnership that would constitute an
investment company under § 351(e) are taxable exchanges, a transfer to ETFs would not
be taxable because the transfers would generally not result in the diversification of an AP¶s
interests as the AP would generally be transferring a diversified portfolio of securities that
is identical to the portfolio of securities held by the transferee ETF. Treas. Reg. § 1.3511(c)(6)(i) (as amended in 1967).
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An AP¶s transfer of appreciated securities would raise the same issues
discussed above with respect to the transfer of cash: the partnership would
book up its assets and make any necessary reverse
§ 704(c) allocations for the existing partners. Any difference between the
AP¶s basis in the transferred securities and their FMV would, when the
securities are sold, be taxed to the contributing AP, and any existing BIG
or BIL in the partnership¶s assets would be taxed only to the current
partners.291
Permitting the tax-free transfer of securities to an ETF in accordance
with normal partnership rules raises the specter of the so-called ³mixing
bowl rules,´ which aim to prevent shifting BIG in property to another party
by contributing it to a partnership.292 These rules apply if (1) contributed
BIG or BIL property is distributed to a partner other than the contributing
partner within seven years of being contributed,293 or (2) other property is
distributed to a partner that has contributed property with BIG.294
Given the normal tax-free treatment of in-kind distributions by a
partnership, in the absence of the mixing bowl rules, a partner could
contribute property with BIG and receive other property tax-free from the
partnership or the BIG property could be distributed tax-free to another
partner. A partner generally does not recognize any gain or loss on the
distribution of property to a partner whether in complete or partial
liquidation of the partner¶s interest in the partnership, except to the extent
a partner receives cash in excess of basis.295 To ensure that gain or loss
does not disappear when property is distributed in a non-liquidating
distribution, the partner takes a carryover basis in the property, but only to
the extent of its basis in its partnership interest.296 In the case of a
liquidating distribution, the partner¶s interest in the property will be equal
to it basis in the partnership.297
291. 26 U.S.C. § 704(c) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3) (2017).
292. Since the enactment of § 704(c)(1)(C), it is generally not possible to shift BIL on
contributed property to other partners. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(f), 79 Fed. Reg.
3042 (Jan. 16, 2014).
293. 26 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) (requiring the contributing partner to recognize gain
upon distribution of contributed property to another partner within seven years).
294. Id. § 737(a)±(b). The contributing partner must recognize gain equal to the lesser
of (1) the FMV of property received over the adjusted basis of the partner¶s interest in the
partnership; or (2) the amount of gain that would be recognized by the contributing partner
if all the property contributed by the partner within the last seven years (and still held by
the partnership) were distributed to another partner. Id.
295. Id. § 731(a)(1)±(2) (providing that gain is recognized only if the money
distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of the partner¶s interest; loss is only recognized if a
partner¶s interest is liquidated and the partner receives only cash and certain ordinary
income items).
296. Id. § 732(a)(1)±(2). The partner reduces its basis by money distributed and the
adjusted basis of the distributed property to the partner.
297. Id. § 732(b).

2017]

THE GREAT ETF TAX SWINDLE

65

Given that APs continually contribute to, and receive securities from,
ETFs as part of the share creation and redemption processes, contributions
to ETFs should be taxable as they are currently. This would relieve ETFs
of the administrative burden of having to track any BIL or BIG upon
contribution of property and to monitor potential application of the mixing
bowl rules.298
7. Distributions of Property
Distributions of property by a partnership raise many of the same
issues as distributions of cash. Distributions of property from a partnership
are generally tax free to the partner, except if the partner receives cash in
excess of his partnership interest or receives in liquidation only cash,
unrealized receivables, and inventory.299 To ensure that gain or loss is
eventually recognized when the distributed property is sold, the partner
takes a carryover basis in the property, limited to the partner¶s basis in his
partnership interest, or if the property is received in liquidation of the
partner¶s interest, the partner¶s basis in the property will be the partner¶s
basis in his partnership interest.300
When a partnership distributes property in kind, the distributee
partner can remove more than or less than his share of the inside basis and
thereby leave too little or too much gain for the remaining partners. To
illustrate, assume the same facts as Example 4, but security 1 has a basis
of $50, security 2 has a basis of $150, and each has a FMV of $200. The
partnership liquidates A¶s interest by distributing security 2. Immediately
after the distribution, A will have a basis of $100 in security 2, which
ensures that when A sells security 2, he will recognize $100 of gain, which
accurately reflects his economic gain. Immediately after the distribution,
the partnership¶s accounts will be as follows:

298. For example, under proposed regulations, a partnership must separately track for
each partner each forward § 704(c) layer and reverse § 704(c) layer. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-3(a)(6)(i). For a discussion, see NYSBA, supra note 257, at 82±94.
299. 26 U.S.C. § 731(a)(1)±(2) (2012). If a partner receives cash in excess of basis, he
will recognize gain. If a partner receives only cash, unrealized receivables, and inventory
with a basis less than the partner¶s basis in his partnership interest, he will recognize loss.
Under § 731(c), marketable securities are treated like cash. This provision would not apply
to ETFs since an ETF would probably qualify as an investment partnership and any AP
would be an eligible partner. Id. § 731(c)(3)(A)(iii).
300. Id. § 732(a)(1)±(2) (providing rules for distributions other than in liquidation of a
partner¶s interest); id. § 732(b) (providing rules for distributions in liquidations). If more
than one property is distributed, the partner¶s basis in its partnership interest must be
allocated among the properties received. See id. § 732(c).
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The distribution of security 2 has resulted in $150 of basis leaving the
partnership, which is greater than A¶s outside basis immediately before the
distribution ($100). A has thus removed more than his share of the
partnership¶s inside basis and therefore has left too much gain for the
remaining partners: if the partnership immediately sold security 1 for
$200, there would be $150 of gain, $125 of which would be allocated to B
and $25 to C. The total outside basis of the partnership would be $450, but
the FMV of the partnership interests would only be $400, resulting in a
temporary over-taxation of B and C.
Similar to the consequences that occur when a partner receives cash
greater than its basis, if a partnership has a § 754 election in effect, under
§ 734 the partnership increases the basis of security 1 by $50, the
difference between A¶s outside basis immediately before the distribution
($100) and the basis of the distributed property ($150).301 Consequently,
the partnership¶s inside basis will now equal the partners¶ total outside
basis.302
Similarly, if the redeeming partner removes less than its share of
inside basis, the partnership must decrease the basis of its property. For
instance, if security 1 with a FMV of $200 and an AB of $50 were
distributed to A in liquidation of its interest, A would take a $100 basis in
the property under § 732(b). Since the basis of the property in the hands
of the partner is increased by $50, the property¶s BIG is decreased by $50.
If the partnership has a § 754 election in effect, the partnership must
decrease the basis of its property by $50 to ensure that the gain is
eventually taxed.303
If ETFs were required to adopt partnership tax principles, they could
continue to distribute property to redeeming APs without triggering
immediate fund level gains. The basis adjustment mechanisms of §§ 732
and 734(b), however, ensure that the BIG in the distributed property is
eventually taxed once.
301. See id. § 734(b)(1)(B).
302. The UXOHVIRUDOORFDWLQJWKHEDVLVDGMXVWPHQWDPRQJDSDUWQHUVKLS¶VSURSHUW\DUH
set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(c) (2017).
303. See 26 U.S.C. § 734(b)(2)(B).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The exemption in § 852(b)(6) from the recognition of gain on the
distribution of appreciated property by RICs should be eliminated. It
provides an unfair tax subsidy for ETFs and encourages the transfer of
capital from other kinds of investment vehicle to ETFs. It also unfairly
benefits high-net-worth owners of ETFs. This article has discussed various
alternatives, including outright repeal, reducing the basis of a fund¶s
remaining assets by any unrecognized gain in the distributed property,
carrying over the basis of distributed property, limiting the basis of
securities that are distributed, and finally, requiring ETFs and ETF-like
mutual funds to be subject to partnership tax principles. Requiring ETFs
and mutual funds to be subject to partnership tax rules is the best option to
ameliorate many of the current deficiencies of Subchapter M.
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